The information environment of Armenia and the dynamics of narratives February 1-8

Monitoring analytical report

1. Context

The first week of February 2026 was marked by the activity of information flows, which was conditioned by the pre-election campaign of a number of political forces. The main emphasis shifted to the realm of personal defamation and external geopolitical influences. Key events, such as Sargis Karapetyan’s controversial podcast and the US Vice President J.D. Vance’s upcoming visit, have become the main driving forces in the formation of narratives.

Summary statistics

Narrative (in descending order)	Main cast	Facebook	Telegram	YouTube	TikTok	General
1. Discrediting competitors	RA media platforms	142	115	68	39	364
2. Borders and trade	Anonymous websites	89	94	55	30	268
3. External influence	Political actors	76	112	59	20	267
4. Armed Forces	RA media platforms	39	115	86	13	253
5. Elections and the Central Election Commission	Anonymous websites	54	82	67	22	225
6. Energy and infrastructure	RA media platforms	48	76	62	18	204
7. Existential threat	Political actors	42	68	55	32	197
8. Europe and Armenia	RA media platforms	51	64	58	18	191
9. Church and State	Political actors	36	72	64	18	190
10. PEACE AND TRIPP	Anonymous websites	28	54	42	14	138
GENERAL		605	852	616	224	2297

2.1. Analysis of narratives and their frequency

The 3 main narratives in the information flow were:

Discrediting competitors(narratives that attempt to discredit political opponents, accuse them of crimes, treason, or conspiracies) –364 items. This is the most extensive topic of the week. The central event was the podcast with the participation of businessman Samvel Karapetyan’s son, Sargis Karapetyan, where his formulations (“There will be no sexually dissatisfied woman in the Strong Armenia.”) were used by the authorities to discredit a political opponent, his family, and the political force. This narrative even reached the international pres – The Telegraph for example. On the other hand, the pro-opposition outlets are working to discredit the authorities by spreading old and manipulative information about the salary increase of Nikol Pashinyan’s daughter, Mariam Pashinyan, by 4.2 million drams, accusing the authorities of corruption and “plunder.”

Borders and trade (Allegations regarding the borders of the Republic of Armenia, import-export and economic dependence)– 268 items.This narrative emphasizes Armenia’s economic dependence and the vulnerability of its border security. Discussions are unfolding especially around Syunik, which is presented as a point of containment for Russia and Iran. J.D. Vance’s upcoming visit to Yerevan and Baku is seen as an attempt by the USA to control the transit routes in the region.

External influence (messages presenting political forces or figures as agents of foreign influence)– 267 items. The issue is being raised also in the form of the thesis of undermining statehood through “Western occupation” and “a network of NGOs.” This narrative is also closely linked to the upcoming visit of US Vice President J.D. Vance and the intensification of Armenian-American relations.

Analysis of the other 7 narratives:

Armed Forces (Messages that negatively represent or discredit the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia) – 253 items. The emphasis is on the internal problems of the army and the suspension of the activities of clergy appointed by the church in the army from February 1.
Elections and the Central Election Commission (distrust in the electoral process and the Central Election Commission or allegations of election fraud)– 225 items. The main accusation is the payment of bonuses to civil servants, and is called “state-sponsored bribery” to elect the authorities in the upcoming elections.
Energy and infrastructure (misinformative claims about power grids, energy security, and infrastructure) – 204 items. This narrative is circulating in parallel with political processes. The main focus is the narrative of “looting” around the Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA), after the Government took over its control.
Existential threat (claims in which electing a political force is presented as a threat to the state’s existential or national security)– 197 items. Elections are presented as struggle for survival, where defeat means the ultimate loss of statehood.
Europe and Armenia (narratives about European institutions and the role of the EU) – 191. EU monitoring mission and financial support are presented as “interference in internal affairs and the erosion of traditional values.”
Church and state (Narratives emerging around the relationship between the Armenian Apostolic Church and the government) – 190 items. The central theme was the narrative of International Religious Freedom Summit and the internationalization of the “repressions” against the Armenian church.
Peace and TRIPP (Emerging narratives around the peace process and Trump’s Route)– 138 items. Despite its low volume, this is a qualitatively important narrative. J.D. Vance’s Expected Visit (February 9) is connected with the practical launch of TRIPP, nuclear energy and technology.

2.2. Analysis of narrative intersections

This week’s key crossover is between the two narratives: “Peace and TRIPP” and “External influence”. More specifically, J.D. Vance’s visit is being presented as an attempt by the US to establish a strategic presence in the region.

The second important intersection is between “Discrediting competitors” and “Energy” narratives. The topic of targeting Samvel Karapetyan’s family is combined with an information attack against the ENA.

2.3. Platform Analysis

Telegram (852 items) remains the main platform for spreading manipulative information and harsh criticism through unknown and/or unidentified information channels. YouTube (616) is actively used for podcasts and long interviews. Facebook (605) serves as a means of targeting the main audience, and TikTok (224) is used for the distribution of emotional short videos. Videos created by various political forces using artificial intelligence tools are also being widely shared on this platform.

2.4. Actor analysis

1. RA media platforms and media outlets.This group has mainly covered the statements and posts of political figures and actors.

2. Anonymous and/or de-identified information websites.These actors, especially on the TikTok social platform, have actively distributed videos created using artificial intelligence-powered tools.

3. Politicians and actors.This group is the main source of narratives. The group has been particularly active in spreading the scandal surrounding Sargis Karapetyan.

3. Time dynamics

Narrative	Sun.	Monday.	Tue.	Dry.	Five.	Friday.	Sat.	Sun.	Quantity
1. Discrediting competitors	16	32	69	79	82	46	28	12	364
2. Borders and trade	9	31	34	29	46	72	36	11	268
3. External influence	8	35	54	45	57	43	16	9	267
4. Armed Forces	12	49	57	19	20	43	41	12	253
5. Elections and the Central Election Commission	3	42	53	33	18	44	27	5	225
6. Energy	8	34	82	18	19	15	21	7	204
7. Existential threat	11	9	38	16	35	26	58	4	197
8. Europe and Armenia	6	21	25	26	77	25	9	2	191
9. Church and State	6	26	51	26	36	21	16	8	190
10. Peace and TRIPP	1	10	43	24	38	4	13	5	138
GENERAL	80	289	506	315	429	339	265	75	2297

4. Conclusions and findings

Targeting the Sargis Karapetyan scandal. It was the most resonant topic of the week, used by the authorities to prematurely neutralize a potential new political rival.
Expectations for J.D. Vance’s visit: The visit of the US Vice President (February 9) is seen as the start of the practical phase of the TRIPP project and a new level of Armenian-American relations.
The internationalization of the church issue. International Religious Freedom Summit gave new impetus to this narrative. Criticism of the steps taken against the church, taking it out of the domestic political sphere.
The information environment is entering a phase of open confrontation, where international visits and personal defamation become the main levers for influencing the electorate.

___________________________________________________________________________

The monitoring was conducted by the information NGO “Multilateral Information Institute” (MDI).

The report has been developed.“Methodology for monitoring the 2026 parliamentary elections of the Republic of Armenia”Automated data collection and report development were carried out using artificial intelligence tools:

LetsdataThe digital monitoring tool was used to collect primary source data,
andClaude, NotebookLMandGeminitools for generating reports.

The analysis is based on a pre-selected list of 250 sources (aka actors). The process was accompanied by professional supervision, with the participation of a monitoring specialist and a data collection specialist, to ensure reliability.

Monitoring Analytical Report: The Information Environment of Armenia and Narrative Dynamics (February 1-8)

1. Context

The first week of February 2026 saw a high volume of information flow, primarily driven by the pre-election campaign activities of various political forces. The central focus shifted towards personal defamation and external geopolitical influences. Key events, such as the controversial podcast involving Sargis Karapetyan and the anticipated visit of US Vice President J.D. Vance, were the main catalysts shaping the narratives.

Summary Statistics

Narrative (in descending order)	Main Actor	Facebook	Telegram	YouTube	TikTok	General
1. Discrediting competitors	RA media platforms	142	115	68	39	364
2. Borders and trade	Anonymous websites	89	94	55	30	268
3. External influence	Political actors	76	112	59	20	267
4. Armed Forces	RA media platforms	39	115	86	13	253
5. Elections and the Central Election Commission	Anonymous websites	54	82	67	22	225
6. Energy and infrastructure	RA media platforms	48	76	62	18	204
7. Existential threat	Political actors	42	68	55	32	197
8. Europe and Armenia	RA media platforms	51	64	58	18	191
9. Church and State	Political actors	36	72	64	18	190
10. PEACE AND TRIPP	Anonymous websites	28	54	42	14	138
GENERAL		605	852	616	224	2297

2.1. Analysis of Narratives and Their Frequency

The information flow was dominated by three main narratives:

Discrediting Competitors (narratives that attempt to discredit political opponents, accusing them of crimes, treason, or conspiracies) – 364 items.
This was the most extensive topic of the week. The central event was a podcast featuring Sargis Karapetyan, the son of businessman Samvel Karapetyan. His statements, such as: “There will be no dissatisfied woman in a strong Armenia,” were used by pro-government forces to discredit a political opponent, his family, and the associated political party. The story even reached the international media, specifically The Telegraph. Conversely, the opposition worked to discredit the authorities by circulating old and manipulative information about a 4.2 million dram salary increase for Nikol Pashinyan’s daughter, Mariam Pashinyan, accusing the government of corruption and “plunder.”
Borders and Trade (allegations concerning the borders of the Republic of Armenia, import/export, and economic dependence) – 268 items.
This narrative highlighted Armenia’s economic dependence and the vulnerability of its border security. Discussions unfolded particularly around Syunik, which was framed as a point of containment for Russia and Iran. J.D. Vance’s upcoming visit to Yerevan and Baku was interpreted as a review of regional transport routes.
External Influence (messages presenting political forces or figures as agents of foreign influence) – 267 items.
The thesis was raised of undermining statehood through “Western occupation” and a “network of NGOs.” This narrative is also closely linked to the upcoming visit of US Vice President J.D. Vance and the intensification of Armenian-American relations.

Analysis of the other 7 narratives:

Armed Forces (messages that negatively represent or discredit the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia) – 253 items. The emphasis was on the internal problems of the army and the suspension of activities for clergy appointed by the church within the army, effective February 1.
Elections and the Central Election Commission (distrust in the electoral process and the Central Election Commission or allegations of election fraud) – 225 items. The main accusation was the payment of bonuses to civil servants, which was termed “state bribery” to elect the authorities in the upcoming elections.
Energy and Infrastructure (misinformative claims about power grids, energy security, and infrastructure) – 204 items. In parallel with political processes, the narrative circulated that ENA (Electric Networks of Armenia) was being “looted.”
Existential Threat (claims in which electing a political force is presented as a threat to the state’s existential or national security) – 197 items. Elections were presented as an ontological struggle, where defeat would mean the ultimate loss of statehood.
Europe and Armenia (narratives about European institutions and the role of the EU) – 191 items. The EU monitoring mission and financial support were presented as “interference in internal affairs and the erosion of traditional values.”
Church and State (narratives emerging around the relationship between the Armenian Apostolic Church and the government) – 190 items. The central theme was the Washington religious freedom summit and the internationalization of “repressions” against the church.
Peace and TRIPP (emerging narratives around the peace process and Trump’s path) – 138 items. Despite its low volume, this is a qualitatively important narrative. J.D. Vance’s expected visit (February 9) was connected with the practical launch of TRIPP, nuclear energy, and high technology.

2.2. Analysis of Narrative Intersections

The week’s key intersection was between “Peace and TRIPP” and “External Influence”: J.D. Vance’s visit was presented as an attempt by the US to establish a strategic presence in the region.

The second important intersection was between “Discrediting Competitors” and “Energy” narratives, where the targeting of Samvel Karapetyan’s family was combined with an information attack against the ENA.

2.3. Platform Analysis

Telegram (852 items) remains the primary platform for spreading manipulative information and harsh criticism via unknown and/or unidentified channels.
YouTube (616 items) is actively used for podcasts and long interviews.
Facebook (605 items) serves as the main channel for targeting the general audience.
TikTok (224 items) is used for distributing emotional short videos. Videos created by various political forces using artificial intelligence tools are also being widely shared on this platform.

2.4. Actor Analysis

RA media platforms and media outlets: This group primarily covered the statements and posts of political figures and actors.
Anonymous and/or de-identified information websites: These actors, especially on the TikTok social platform, actively distributed videos created using artificial intelligence-powered tools.
Politicians and actors: This group is the main source of narratives and was particularly active in spreading the scandal surrounding Sargis Karapetyan.

3. Time Dynamics

Narrative	Sun.	Mon.	Tue.	Wed.	Thu.	Fri.	Sat.	Sun.	Quantity
1. Discrediting competitors	16	32	69	79	82	46	28	12	364
2. Borders and trade	9	31	34	29	46	72	36	11	268
3. External influence	8	35	54	45	57	43	16	9	267
4. Armed Forces	12	49	57	19	20	43	41	12	253
5. Elections and the Central Election Commission	3	42	53	33	18	44	27	5	225
6. Energy	8	34	82	18	19	15	21	7	204
7. Existential threat	11	9	38	16	35	26	58	4	197
8. Europe and Armenia	6	21	25	26	77	25	9	2	191
9. Church and State	6	26	51	26	36	21	16	8	190
10. Peace and TRIPP	1	10	43	24	38	4	13	5	138
GENERAL	80	289	506	315	429	339	265	75	2297

4. Conclusions and Findings

Targeting the Sargis Karapetyan scandal: This was the most resonant topic of the week, used by the authorities to prematurely neutralize a potential new political rival.
Expectations for J.D. Vance’s visit: The visit of the US Vice President (February 9) is seen as the start of the practical phase of the TRIPP project and a new level of Armenian-American relations.
The internationalization of the church issue: The Washington Summit gave new impetus to criticism of the steps taken against the church, internationalizing the issue by taking it out of the domestic political sphere.
The information environment is entering a phase of open confrontation, where international visits and personal defamation become the main levers for influencing the electorate.

—–The monitoring was conducted by the information NGO “Multilateral Information Institute” (MDI).

The report was developed using the Methodology for monitoring the 2026 parliamentary elections of the Republic of Armenia. Automated data collection and report development were carried out using artificial intelligence tools:

The Letsdata digital monitoring tool was used to collect primary source data.
Claude, NotebookLM, and Gemini tools were used for generating reports.

The analysis is based on a pre-selected list of 250 sources (also known as actors). The process was accompanied by professional supervision, with the participation of a monitoring specialist and a data collection specialist, to ensure reliability.

The information environment of Armenia and the dynamics of narratives February 9-15

Monitoring analytical report

1. Context

On the eve of the 2026 parliamentary elections, the information environment in Armenia is characterized by high polarization and the growth of hybrid threats. The main trend between February 9-15 is the targeting of political rivals and the consistent reduction of trust in state institutions. The patterns of narrative circulation are closely interconnected with foreign policy developments, in particular, the “Trump Route” (TRIPP) and border security issues.

Our research team predicts that as the elections approach, the topics of “existential threat” and “foreign influence” will become the main driving force of information flows.

Summary statistics

Narrative (in descending order)	Main cast	Facebook	Telegram	YouTube	TikTok	General
1. Discrediting competitors	RA media platforms	87	86	139	26	338
2. Borders and trade	RA media platforms	39	92	156	18	305
3. Armed Forces	RA media platforms	28	95	122	24	269
4. Elections and the Central Election Commission	RA media platforms	76	111	70	7	264
5. Europe and Armenia	RA media platforms	35	68	144	8	255
6. Energy and infrastructure	RA media platforms	18	75	106	20	219
7. Existential threat	RA media platforms	23	29	143	13	208
8. Church and State	RA media platforms	19	58	106	8	191
9. PEACE AND TRIPP	RA media platforms	42	88	10	0	140
10. External influence	RA media platforms	14	18	59	9	100
GENERAL		381	720	1055	133	2289

2.1. Analysis of narratives and their frequency

Top trend of the week is “Discrediting competitors” (narratives that attempt to discredit political opponents, accuse them of crimes, treason, or conspiracies). This narrative is in a dominant position 338 items. This is due to the aggressive phase of the pre-election campaign, where political forces use mutual accusations of “treason” and “corruption”. For example, legal actions taken against opposition figures are presented as political repression, which is intended to cast doubt on the fairness of the electoral process.

Second key theme “Borders and Trade” (Allegations regarding the borders of the Republic of Armenia, import-export and economic dependence) (305 items) The narrative emphasizes Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia and the decline in foreign trade. The analyses indicate that the neutralization of the gold re-export factor led to a 29% drop in indicators, which is interpreted as a failure of economic policy.

“Armed Forces” (Messages that negatively represent or discredit the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia)(269 items)The narrative continues to be targeted. The public display of defensive fortifications by Defense Minister Suren Papikyan and its criticism have been particularly actively circulated. An assertion is made that such propaganda videos reveal military secrets and jeopardize the country’s defense capabilities for the benefit of pre-election PR.

Analysis of the other 7 narratives:

Elections and the Central Election Commission (distrust in the electoral process and the Central Election Commission or allegations of election fraud)– 264 items. They focus on the possibility of electoral fraud and abuse of administrative resources. For example, criminal charges for obstructing citizens’ freedom of will in the November elections the works։
Europe and Armenia (narratives about European institutions and the role of the EU)– 255 items. Western funding and monitoring missions are presented as biased forces. The 12 million euros in support provided by the EU is interpreted as an intervention.
Energy and infrastructure (misinformation claims about power grids, energy security and infrastructure) – 219 items. Emphasis is placed on dependence on Rosatom and safety issues at the Metsamor nuclear power plant.
Existential threat (claims in which electing a political force is presented as a threat to the state’s existential or national security)– 208 items. It is noted that Armenia is viewed not as a sovereign state, but as a governed political territory, where elections serve not as a real choice, but as a formal confirmation of already made decisions.
Church and state (Armenian Anarratives emerging around the relationship between the Rachel church and the government) –191 items: News about criminal prosecutions against clergymen, which are spread on Telegram as an “attack on national values,” predominate.
Peace and TRIPP (Emerging narratives around the peace process and Trump’s path)– 140 items. “The Trump Way” (TRIPP) qualifies as an American project in favor of Azerbaijan and Turkey.
External influence(messages presenting political forces or figures as agents of foreign influence)– 100 items. AppliedThe term “agent of influence” is used to label politicians who serve “hostile theses.”

2.2. Analysis of narrative intersections

Several major cross-cutting issues were observed this week. The first intersection is the “Peace Process” and “Borders/Trade”. In particular, TRIPP is presented as a transit corridor project that will connect Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, bypassing Russia and Iran.

The second important intersection “Church and State” and “External influence” is among the themes. The steps taken against the Church are interpreted as an externally dictated agenda aimed at weakening Armenian identity. This narrative is closely coupled with accusations of “serving Turkish-Azerbaijani interests.”

2.3. Platform Analysis

YouTube (1055 items) is the main platform where analytical discussions take place. Telegram (720) is used for operational news and leaks. On Facebook (381) official statements prevail, and on TikTok (133) we observe emotional short videos.

2.4. Actor analysis

1. RA media platforms and media outlets. This group generates the lion’s share of content. The media often acts as a mouthpiece for political forces, ensuring the wide dissemination of narratives.

2. Anonymous and/or de-identified information websites. They are actively spreading misinformation and “fake news” aimed at sowing panic.

3. Politicians and actors. This group is the main source of narratives, whose speeches become the basis of media streams.

3. Time dynamics

Narrative	Monday.	Tue.	Dry.	Five.	Friday.	Sat.	Sun.	Quantity
1. Discrediting competitors	31	61	112	72	31	22	9	338
2. Borders and trade	68	72	40	39	69	12	5	305
3. Armed Forces	39	37	76	51	33	24	9	269
4. Elections and the Central Election Commission	29	14	93	44	46	22	16	264
5. Europe and Armenia	33	46	49	33	76	14	4	255
6.Energy	15	70	38	39	41	12	4	219
7. Existential threat	21	33	40	41	44	22	7	208
8. Church and State	11	24	23	47	30	22	34	191
9. PEACE AND TRIPP	36	31	27	21	11	12	2	140
10. External influence	9	17	34	15	12	10	3	100
GENERAL	292	405	532	402	393	172	93	2289

4. Conclusions and findings

Escalation of information warfare. The analysis of 2289 posts shows that the information field fully serves pre-election purposes. “Discrediting competitors” has become the No. 1 agenda.
Targeting institutions.The discrediting of the armed forces and the Church is systematic.:
External factor manipulation. TRIPP and Western influence are used as a tool՝ To scare voters with the “loss of sovereignty.”
Actors’ synchronization. The media simultaneously and systematically promote targeted narratives, creating a closed information environment where the audience receives information that aligns with their own views.

___________________________________________________________________________

The monitoring was conducted by the “Media Diversity Institute” NGO (MDI)

The report has been developed.“Methodology for monitoring the 2026 parliamentary elections of the Republic of Armenia” Automated data collection and report development were carried out using artificial intelligence tools:

Letsdata The digital monitoring tool was used to collect primary source data,
and Claude, NotebookLM and Gemini tools for generating reports.

The analysis is based on 250 pre-selected sources (same as actors) on the list. The process was accompanied by professional supervision, with the participation of a monitoring specialist and a data collection specialist, to ensure reliability.

Statement

Tomorrow, October 21, the agenda of the National Assembly session includes a bill proposing amendments to the Law on Audiovisual Media of the Republic of Armenia. This short document stipulates that the number of public broadcasters shall not be fewer than two, instead of three as defined in the current law. Moreover, the requirement to have an educational-cultural program is being removed. From this, as well as from the explanatory note to the bill, it becomes clear that the purpose is to exclude the spiritual-cultural TV channel Shoghakat from the list of public broadcasters.

We, the undersigned journalistic organizations, find it unnecessary to go into detail regarding the official justification for this change, as it is overly general, in some ways misleading, unconvincing, and raises many questions. In reality, the initiative is not based on the cited financial, managerial, qualitative, or operational concerns, but rather on an obvious political context — the escalating confrontation between the authorities and the Armenian Apostolic Church, with which Shoghakat TV is closely associated.

It is noteworthy that, according to the current law, broadcasters cannot be founded or sponsored by religious organizations. This approach has been revised and altered several times throughout Armenia’s independence — the restriction being lifted or reinstated according to political expediency. Just as the inclusion of Shoghakat in the public broadcasting system was once politically motivated, its current reconsideration is equally driven by the above-mentioned conflict.

Meanwhile, the public interest requires that cultural, spiritual, educational, scientific, and other similar topics — which generally do not pursue commercial goals but are crucial for societal development — remain among the main priorities of the Public Broadcaster. The proposed legislative amendment conveys the opposite impression.

The officially stated goal of “more efficient use of resources and optimization of activities” could have been achieved without this amendment — while preserving the integrity of the educational-cultural programming.

Realistically, it is not difficult to predict that the parliamentary majority will approve the proposed bill, especially since it has already received the endorsement of the Standing Committee on Science, Education, Culture, Diaspora, Youth, and Sports of the National Assembly.

Nevertheless, even if the wording “at least two programs” is adopted, this does not preclude the Public Broadcaster from maintaining a third program entirely dedicated to cultural, spiritual, educational, scientific, and similar themes. This is what the public interest demands, and we call on the authorities to treat it as a priority and to act accordingly.

Furthermore, we urge the authorities to abandon the practice of adopting situational, short-term approaches to media legislation — a worrying trend that undermines the effective functioning and development of the sector.

Committee to Protect Freedom of Expression
Yerevan Press Club
Media Initiatives Center
Media Diversity Institute – Armenia
Public Journalism Club
Journalists for the Future NGO
Journalists for Human Rights NGO

ԽՈՍՔԻ ԱԶԱՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՊԱՇՏՊԱՆՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԿՈՄԻՏԵ
ԵՐԵՎԱՆԻ ՄԱՄՈՒԼԻ ԱԿՈՒՄԲ
ՄԵԴԻԱ ՆԱԽԱՁԵՌՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ ԿԵՆՏՐՈՆ
ԲԱԶՄԱԿՈՂՄԱՆԻ ՏԵՂԵԿԱՏՎՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԻՆՍՏԻՏՈՒՏ – ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆ
ՀԱՆՐԱՅԻՆ ԼՐԱԳՐՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԱԿՈՒՄԲ
«ԼՐԱԳՐՈՂՆԵՐ ՀԱՆՈՒՆ ԱՊԱԳԱՅԻ» ՀԿ
«ԼՐԱԳՐՈՂՆԵՐ ՀԱՆՈՒՆ ՄԱՐԴՈՒ ԻՐԱՎՈՒՆՔՆԵՐԻ» ՀԿ

Armenia -- RFE/RL Microphone on a stand, Yerevan, 27Feb2025

STATEMENT

Over the past week, a wave of targeting and defaming Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Armenian Service through social media posts has been observed, which is highly concerning from the perspective of ensuring freedom of expression in the country. While this campaign had started earlier, it intensified significantly after some high-ranking officials and their supporters made accusations against the media.

In this regard, the Facebook posts by Arayik Harutyunyan, the Chief of Staff to the RA Prime Minister, Ruben Rubinyan, the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, and Artur Hovhannisyan, the Secretary of the “Civil Contract” parliamentary faction, are particularly noteworthy. In these posts, they specifically accuse RFE/RL’s Armenian Service of disseminating fake news or biased reporting, and also question the professionalism of the media.

Many of those who have joined the criticism have reserved the right to instruct the editorial office, going so far as telling them who should be invited for interviews, what questions should be posed, or why a comment from an opposition figure, which drastically contradicts the official position, is published.

This is nothing more than a reprehensible attempt to interfere with editorial freedom—something that cannot be tolerated either by the media or the broader journalistic community, regardless of their political leanings. This is particularly the case given that RFE/RL’s Armenian Service has proven through its work that it is open to presenting opposing views and ideas, as well as addressing and correcting its possible flaws.

Meanwhile, in this case, instead of tolerating and accepting criticism, eliminating the identified flaws, and countering opponents with their own arguments, high-ranking government representatives are, in fact, turning their “fire” on the editorial office, which is one of the leading media outlets in terms of rich experience and traditions in quality journalism in the Armenian media field. This is especially unacceptable in light of the current circumstances, when quality media are objectively going through difficult times, facing serious financial and political issues.

We, the undersigned journalistic organizations, observing that the recent publications that have prompted the targeting of RFE/RL’s Armenian Service and the making of unfounded accusations against it concern matters of public significance, and that attempts to hinder their coverage by targeting any media are unacceptable, call on:

government representatives to put an end to the practice of orchestrating campaigns to discredit this and any other media, and resolve information disputes and express disagreements on the same platforms, by using the opportunities for refutation or response;
the media to resist political pressure, while ensuring pluralism and contributing to the exercise of citizens’ right to be informed;
the society to consistently demand that the authorities stay true to democratic values, respect freedom of expression, and display tolerance towards criticism, especially when dealing with media that maintain high professional standards.

COMMITTEE TO PROTECT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

YEREVAN PRESS CLUB

MEDIA INITIATIVES CENTER

MEDIA DIVERSITY INSTITUTE-ARMENIA

PUBLIC JOURNALISM CLUB

JOURNALISTS’ CLUB “ASPAREZ”

“JOURNALISTS FOR THE FUTURE” NGO

“JOURNALISTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS” NGO

GORIS PRESS CLUB

Armenia -- Artur Papyan takes part in an online conference in Seoul, 19Mar2024

Experts Gather to Address Internet Shutdowns and Their Impact on Democracy

Seoul, March 19th – A panel of global experts, convened today to discuss the critical issue of internet shutdowns and their impact on democracy and the fulfillment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The panel discussions, titled “Access for democracy: Preventing internet shutdowns and strengthening democracy,” was part of the Summit for Democracy Conference held in Seoul on March 18-20, 2024.

The session highlighted the contradiction between the rapid digitization of societies and the continuing practice by some authorities to suspend or throttle internet services during significant national events. With countries representing half of the world’s population heading to polls in 2024, the risk of arbitrary and authoritarian shutdowns looms larger than ever, necessitating a collaborative approach to safeguard internet access.

Speakers, including Kanbar Hossein-Bor from the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Carly Ramsey from Cloudflare, Raman Jit Singh Chima from Access Now, Miraj Chowdhury from Digitally Right Bangladesh, including Artur Papyan from Media Diversity Institute – Armenia, and moderated by Brittany Piovesan of Internews, shared insights and experiences from their work and regions.

Artur Papyan underscored the complexity of identifying internet shutdowns, citing challenges such as differentiating between complete and partial shutdowns, geographical scope, and the technical nuances of internet infrastructure and ISPs, especially in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh war.

The panel discussed various strategies to combat internet shutdowns, from leveraging statements by bodies like the Freedom Online Coalition to Cloudflare’s transparency reports, which provide crucial data for understanding the occurrence of shutdowns.

three wise monkey sitting on bench, not hear, not see, do not speak

Appeal of Armenian Journalistic Organizations to Colleagues Attending The Media Forum Organized by Azerbaijan

We, the undersigned organizations, have no questions to the leadership of Azerbaijan – the country, which holds one of the lowest places in international freedom of expression rankings but is hosting yet another pompous media forum on July 22-23. Similarly, we have no questions to Azerbaijan’s Media Development Agency, the event organizer, which endorses all government initiatives that restrict freedom of speech and regularly targets human rights organizations for their criticism of the massive suppression of journalists’ rights in the country. Unfortunately, there are no additional questions to the reputable media and other professional entities that have delegated their representatives to the Forum, held with the sole purpose of legitimizing Baku’s foreign and domestic policies, which contradict to the fundamental values of the civilized world – such lack of integrity has long become business as usual for many.

Our question is addressed to fellow journalists who are currently enjoying the lavish hospitality of the Aliyev regime while finding themselves just a few kilometers away from the cities and villages of Nagorno-Karabagh, living in isolation from the outside world for more than seven months. Within this setting, thousands of people have been deprived of access to basic food for an extended period, women in childbirth are unable to reach hospital due to the scarcity of petrol, water supply is threatened due to a shortage of electricity: doesn’t your professional duty drive you to demand freedom of movement from the Azerbaijani authorities in order to witness a tragedy with few parallels in the modern world? Isn’t it anymore essential for the media to continue its role in breaking through information blockades, particularly in a situation where news about unfolding events is provided exclusively by biased sources? Will you really allow yourselves to be swayed by credulity, an unusual approach for professionals in our field, and embrace the arguments of the Forum’s hosts that assert their eagerness to assist your journey just a short drive away to Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabagh, attributing any hindrance to your passage to the local Armenian leadership or Russian peacekeepers?

Your determination and perseverance, in fact, could contribute to breaking the current impasse in the region. We firmly believe that this seemingly minor episode in the history of journalism may have significant implications for the future reputation of our shared profession.

YEREVAN PRESS CLUB

MEDIA INITIATIVES CENTER

MEDIA DIVERSITY INSTITUTE-ARMENIA

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CENTER

PUBLIC JOURNALISM CLUB

COMMITTEE TO PROTECT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

JOURNALISTS’ CLUB “ASPAREZ”

“JOURNALISTS FOR THE FUTURE” NGO

“JOURNALISTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS” NGO

GORIS PRESS CLUB

“FEMIDA” NGO

“Media organizations express deep concern over the contradictions in the external and internal agendas of reforms in Armenia.”

We, the undersigned journalistic organizations, express our deep concern over the contradictions in the external and internal agendas of reforms envisaged in various sectors in Armenia.

In particular, several journalistic organizations were notified of the opportunity to submit proposals regarding the draft decision “On establishing the procedure for the relationship of the Supreme Judicial Council, the SJC, courts and judges with media” until July 14, 2023. This document contains a range of promising provisions, for example, that “media representatives can freely attend the open sessions and working consultations of the Supreme Judicial Council, film and photograph, and even immediately livestream the events.”

In fact, in the period when the representatives of the journalistic community were supposed to develop proposals on the draft decision, a scandalous incident occurred on July 3: the SJC refused journalists’ access to its previously announced open session, where a matter of public interest was being discussed. In the days that followed, many of our colleagues and ourselves criticized that incident through different platforms and were waiting for clarifications of the Supreme Judicial Council about what happened, as well as forward-looking conclusions. Unfortunately, there was no response, which could not but make reveal the secret of contradiction lying between the two processes.

We have grounds to infer that the broad-minded approach reflected in the draft decision by the SCJ is conditioned by the simple fact that it is being developed within the frames of a joint project with the Swedish National Courts Administration and due to the financial support of the Swedish Government, for which we are only grateful. Nonetheless, the July 3 session of the Supreme Judicial Council took place in our domestic reality, away from the scrutiny of the international community.

Through this statement, we firmly reiterate that such discrepancies between the agendas of international cooperation and the practical execution of “reforms” within the country are unacceptable to us.

Our principled approach is to contribute to endeavors aimed at enhancing the role of media in the institutional progress across various sectors in Armenia. However, we consider it unacceptable to engage in merely formal, windowdressing initiatives.

We also call on the international partners of the RA state structures to demonstrate consistency and pay greater attention to the efficiency of the ongoing processes, ensuring that the reforms announced on paper are duly reflected in real life.

YEREVAN PRESS CLUB

MEDIA INITIATIVES CENTER

MEDIA DIVERSITY INSTITUTE-ARMENIA

PUBLIC JOURNALISM CLUB

The Statement is open for signatures

Armenia -- People holding phones in their hands, Yerevan, 26Apr2023

Online anonymity in Armenia

Online anonymity is a guarantee of freedom of expression in the digital age. Without anonymity, people are less likely to express themselves freely, for fear of reprisal. This can have a chilling effect on free speech, especially in countries where freedom of expression is already restricted.

Media Diversity Institute has developed a policy brief entitled — “The Right to Online Anonymity in Armenia,” which examines the legal regulations of online anonymity in Armenia. The report finds that the current regulations are inadequate and do not adequately protect the right to online anonymity. The report makes a number of recommendations for improving the legal framework for online anonymity in Armenia.

The report is intended for a wide range of audiences, including the media, human rights defenders, industry experts, state administration bodies, and legislators. The report is available in PDF format at this link.

Armenia -- AI Generated illustration of protests and internet shutdowns, Yerevan, 13Apr2023

Open letter: Armenian government must safeguard internet access and freedom of expression, abandon the provisions in law “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law”

To: Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia

CC: National Security Service of the Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Armenia, Ministry of High Tech Industry of the Republic of Armenia

Nations across Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and the world, must ensure people can access open, secure, and free internet when they need it the most — during important national events. We urge the Republic of Armenia to #KeepItOn.

Respected Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and National Assembly Speaker Alen Simonyan,

We, the undersigned organizations, and members of the #KeepItOn coalition — a global network of over 300 organizations from 105 countries working to end internet shutdowns — write to urgently appeal to you and all relevant authorities, to reject signing into law broad restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and opinion outlined in Article 8 of On the Legal Regime of Martial Law and commit to maintaining unfettered access to internet for all, during both conflict and peacetime. Open, secure, reliable, and accessible internet is vital to exercising and protecting human rights, as well as ensuring safety during crises and conflicts.

Rising censorship in Armenia

Last year, around the time of the 13 September military offensive at the Azerbaijan-Armenia border, your government deliberately interfered with TikTok, making the popular app unavailable in Armenia. Authorities also blocked several Azerbaijani media outlets in the territory of Armenia.

On September 23, 2022, Media Diversity Institute – Armenia sent a request to the National Security Service of the Republic of Armenia to clarify the legal basis under which the authorities shut down and blocked access to TikTok and media websites. In January 2023, the National Security Service Director’s Chief of Staff defended your government’s actions by citing Article 15 of the Law on Security Services and claiming that this provision gives the government the power to “oversee information security matters.”

This justification is entirely inadequate, as Article 15 of the Law on Security Services provides no basis for either internet shutdowns or blockings of specific websites. The Chief of Staff’s official response, however, stated that there are ongoing discussions to also “adjust the legislation,” likely to give authorities such power. Any such changes would be a disaster for human rights online.

Alarmingly, in December 2022, the Armenian Ministry of Justice submitted draft amendments and supplements to “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law,” that would grant your government, under declaration of martial law, the power to restrict the right to freedom of expression and opinion through temporary blockings of websites, social media, internet applications, and through partial or complete internet shutdowns across the territory of the Republic of Armenia. The amendments also provide for temporary confiscation or seizure of media equipment such as printing devices and copiers, as well as radio broadcasting and sound amplifying equipment which would hinder the work of media and journalists. The new rules and procedures governing the use of communication means and accreditation of journalists also risk restricting freedom of press and free expression.

The #KeepItOn coalition joins Armenian civil society organizations and international NGOs such as the Committee to Protect Journalists in strongly opposing this legislation, which poses serious threat to the freedom of expression in Armenia and represents “an excuse to curtail press freedom.”

Impeding access to the internet harms human rights and safety

Unhampered internet connectivity is crucial for the protection of human rights such as freedom of opinion and expression, access to information, freedom of the press, and freedom of peaceful assembly. Restricting internet access in any manner disrupts the flow of information and hinders

reporting and accountability for human rights abuses.

Shutting or slowing down access to the internet directly interferes with all aspects of people’s daily lives including their ability to express views and opinions freely, communicate with loved ones, organize online openly and with no restrictions, access education and healthcare, and conduct business. Internet shutdowns make it extremely difficult for journalists, the media, and human rights defenders to carry out their work, thereby denying people both inside and outside of the affected country access to credible information.

Shutting down internet or social media access during conflicts and crises is disproportionate and amounts to collective punishment, depriving people of fundamental rights, including people’s right to political participation. This cannot be justified as a tactical response. Such measures indicate the intention to thwart free expression and control narratives. Authorities in Armenia are under an obligation to refrain from issuing orders that undermine international human rights standards. Private companies also have a responsibility to respect human rights that exist above and independent of domestic law.

International human rights frameworks condemn internet shutdowns

Interfering with internet connection to restrict people’s ability to communicate, express themselves, and receive adequate information during emergencies and crises is a violation of the fundamental right to freedom of expression, provided in Articles 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Internet shutdowns are strongly condemned in international convenings, including in the United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 47/16 that denounces “the use of Internet shutdowns to intentionally and arbitrarily prevent or disrupt access to or dissemination of information.” The Human Rights Council in its recent report Internet shutdowns: trends, causes, legal implications and impacts on a range of human rights urges authorities to not impose internet shutdowns. Moreover, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that “switching off the internet causes incalculable damage, both in material and human rights terms” while “the costs to jobs, education, health and political participation virtually always exceed any hoped for benefit.”

According to Article 4 of the ICCPR, states may “take measures derogating from their obligations under the Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.” In the view of the UN Human Rights Committee, this requirement reflects “the principle of proportionality which is common to derogation and limitation powers.” In other words, “any derogation measure shall be such only as are strictly necessary to deal with the threat to the life of the nation and are proportionate to its nature and extent.” Internet shutdowns, by contrast, disproportionately impact all users, and unnecessarily restrict access to information and emergency services communications during crucial moments that makes them “disproportionate by default.”

The undersigned organizations and members of the #KeepItOn coalition join our partners in unequivocally condemning any attempts to legitimize online censorship and internet shutdowns, at any time. While Armenia is facing real and serious threats to its security posed by Azerbaijan, there is no legitimate reason to limit your own population’s access to the internet and social media, including platforms like TikTok.

We respectfully call on the Armenian government to remove the provisions in the Law “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law” curtailing internet and media freedom and bring the Law in full compliance with international human rights.

ORGANIZATIONS

Access Now

African Freedom of Expression Exchange (AFEX)

Africa Freedom of Information Centre (AFIC)

Africa Media and Information Technology Initiative (AfriMITI)

Africa Open Data and Internet Research Foundation

Amnesty International

Bloggers of Zambia

Blueprint for Free Speech

Centre for Community Empowerment and Development- Malawi

Center for Media Studies and Peacebuilding (CEMESP-Liberia)

Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)

Committee to Protect Journalists

Office of Civil Freedoms

Change Tanzania Movement

Digital Rights Kashmir

Digital Paradigm (Kazakhstan)

Eurasian Digital Foundation (Kazakhstan)

Factcheck.kz

Gambia Press Union (GPU)

Heartland Initiative

Human Constanta

Human Rights Centre Somaliland

Human Rights Consulting Group (Kazakhstan)

I4C Center for Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights

IFEX

Innovation For Change (I4C) South Asia

International Press Center

Internet Freedom Kazakhstan (ifkz.org)

Internet Policy Observatory Pakistan

Internet Protection Society (Russia)

Internet Sans Frontières

Igbanet (Africa)

JCA-NET(Japan)

KICTANet, Kenya

Kijiji Yeetu

Media Diversity Institute – Armenia

Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA)

MediaNet (Kazakhstan)

Media Rights Agenda (MRA)

Miaan Group

Organization of the Justice Campaign‏- OJC

Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)

OpenNet Africa

Paradigm Initiative (PIN)

PEN America

PEN Armenia

Ranking Digital Rights

Roskomsvoboda

Sassoufit Collective

SMEX

Software Freedom Law Center, India

South East Europe Media Organisation (SEEMO)

Teplitsa. Technologies for Social Good (te-st.org)

The Tor Project

Ubunteam

YODET

Women of Uganda Network (WOUGNET)

Zaina Foundation

Statement on the Restrictions Envisaged Under Martial Law

January 12, 2023, Yerevan

From December 22, 2022 to January 6, 2023, the draft on making amendments and supplements to the RA Law “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law” was submitted for discussion by the RA Ministry of Justice on e-draft.am, the unified website for publication of legal acts’ drafts. According to the proposed changes, in case of declaration of martial law, points 13-15 of the revised Article 8 of the mentioned law envisage:

restriction of freedom to express an opinion, as well as temporary confiscation or detention of printing devices, radio broadcasting, sound amplifying equipment, copiers, establishment of a special procedure for accreditation of journalists, and special rules for using communication means;

restriction of content broadcast on television and disseminated via the Internet, ensuring the showing of movies and TV programs, as well as dissemination of information with exclusively military-patriotic content;

temporary suspension (blocking) of websites, social networks, Internet applications, as well as partial or complete restriction of Internet access in the territory of the Republic of Armenia.

We, the undersigned organizations, mindful of the need for certain restrictions under martial law, nevertheless, express our conviction that the above-mentioned provisions of the draft law in this form are not based on proper discussions, assessment of apparent risks and analysis of possible highly negative consequences, and therefore should be fully rejected.

From a purely professional standpoint, these provisions are so vulnerable and raise so many questions that we consider it pointless to dwell on them in detail. We also express our deep concern that in a country presenting democracy as a national brand the government has published such a document.

There is no doubt that especially under martial law even greater importance is attached to the fight against fake news, disinformation, hostile propaganda and cyber-attacks. However, the related legal regulations should be reasonable, clearer so that no loopholes are left for arbitrariness. If the authorities are prone to this approach, then they simply must present to the public the problems encountered, the justifications and measures for their urgent solutions, and only after that come up with a legislative initiative.

Considering the above, we demand from the RA government:

to refrain from officially circulating the draft law and hold public discussions on the topic from scratch, starting with the analysis of the idea;

to form a working group that will clarify the goals and objectives of the proposed amendments and draft a new bill based on that, keeping it free from formulations that would allow for subjective interpretations and arbitrary actions;

to submit the new version of the draft law for international examination;

to discuss the possibilities of consulting expert circles when deciding to apply restrictions in the conditions of martial law, as well as to develop mechanisms for exercising public supervision over the execution of these decisions.

COMMITTEE TO PROTECT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

YEREVAN PRESS CLUB

MEDIA INITIATIVES CENTER

MEDIA DIVERSITY INSTITUTE-ARMENIA

JOURNALISTS’ CLUB “ASPAREZ”

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CENTER

PUBLIC JOURNALISM CLUB

“JOURNALISTS FOR THE FUTURE” NGO

“JOURNALISTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS” NGO

GORIS PRESS CLUB

“FEMIDA” NGO

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Monitoring analytical report

1. Context

Summary statistics

2.1. Analysis of narratives and their frequency

2.2. Analysis of narrative intersections

2.3. Platform Analysis

2.4. Actor analysis

3. Time dynamics

4. Conclusions and findings

Monitoring analytical report

1. Context

Summary statistics

2.1. Analysis of narratives and their frequency

2.2. Analysis of narrative intersections

2.3. Platform Analysis

2.4. Actor analysis

3. Time dynamics

4. Conclusions and findings

January 12, 2023, Yerevan

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