Monitoring Analytical Report
1. Context
The third week of May 2026 was characterized by a high density of pre-election information flows, recording 3,049 publications. At this stage of the campaign, the information environment remained highly polarized and was primarily focused on political discreditation, external influence, electoral processes, and security-related topics.
During the week, a sharp increase was observed in several narratives. On May 20, the “External Influence” narrative became particularly intense, driven by discussions regarding foreign agents, intelligence services, and the involvement of external actors. Toward the end of the week (May 24), the dominant narratives shifted to “Borders and Trade” and “Peace and TRIPP,” driven by active discussions on regional communications, railway links, and the potential opening of borders.
2. Summary Statistics
| Narrative and Volume of Materials (in descending order) | Actor Groups | Telegram | YouTube | TikTok | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Discrediting of Opponents | Armenian media platforms | 159 | 141 | 44 | 26 | 370 |
| 2. External Influence | Armenian media platforms | 90 | 111 | 91 | 63 | 355 |
| 3. Existential Threat | Armenian media platforms | 81 | 87 | 142 | 42 | 352 |
| 4. Borders and Trade | Armenian media platforms | 98 | 158 | 73 | 22 | 351 |
| 5. Elections and CEC | Armenian media platforms | 139 | 140 | 23 | 14 | 316 |
| 6. Energy and Infrastructure | Armenian media platforms | 77 | 172 | 35 | 30 | 314 |
| 7. Armed Forces | Armenian media platforms | 70 | 131 | 37 | 42 | 280 |
| 8. Europe and Armenia | Armenian media platforms | 73 | 95 | 80 | 16 | 264 |
| 9. Church and State | Armenian media platforms | 25 | 100 | 61 | 38 | 224 |
| 10. Peace and TRIPP | Armenian media platforms | 79 | 98 | 30 | 16 | 223 |
| TOTAL | 891 | 1233 | 616 | 309 | 3049 |
2.1. Narrative Frequency Analysis
Key weekly trends and narratives:
1. Discrediting of Opponents (370 publications) – During the penultimate week of May, political confrontation continued to be framed through personal insults, threats, narratives of “obstructed gatherings,” and portrayals of opponents as acting under “orders” or external sponsorship. One of the most widely circulated episodes was Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s remark during an election campaign stop in Arabkir, in a conversation with a citizen: “If you are Rob, we will humiliate you. I will humiliate Rob, I will humiliate the ‘Kaluga guy,’ I will humiliate Gago, I will humiliate Serzh.” This statement became the central reference point of the week’s “discrediting of opponents” narrative. A similar tone appeared in another incident in Spitak, where, in response to a citizen speaking about the fire at the military barracks in Azat village, Pashinyan stated: “The Kaluga oligarch gives 200,000 and sends people.” In this case, the citizen’s complaint was framed not as a personal grievance, but as an action allegedly organized by a political rival. Additional tension was generated by an incident involving Pashinyan and Artur Osipyan, leader of the “Revolutionary Party of Artsakh.” Pashinyan’s statement “You should have gone and died, why are you alive, get lost, you bastard” – became one of the most intense episodes of the week. This was followed by a criminal case initiated on charges of hooliganism, and Osipyan was detained for two months.
On May 18, a video circulated online showing a group of masked and armed individuals issuing threats and insults directed at Nikol Pashinyan. The Investigative Committee announced the initiation of criminal proceedings on charges including preparation of murder, cyber sabotage, and illegal circulation of firearms and ammunition.
Claims also circulated that Narek Karapetyan, a representative of the “Strong Armenia” party, is a Russian citizen. In response, the team announced plans to file lawsuits against members of the ruling Civil Contract party for spreading misinformation, adding that “the money that Civil Contract members will be forced to pay for spreading lies will be directed to the mental health center in Sevan.”
Opposition circles also actively circulated statements aimed at personal and psychological discrediting of Pashinyan, including claims that “Nikol Pashinyan is mentally ill and has no red lines.”
2. External Influence (355 publications) – The narrative recorded a sharp increase, particularly on May 20, when the information space saw intensified circulation of claims related to “foreign influence,” “agent networks,” and the involvement of external actors.
One of the most widely discussed topics of the week became a publication by The Insider, according to which Samvel Karapetyan’s passport file reportedly contained “workplace” information listed as the “FSB Information Center” (“ИЦ ФСБ”). The publication spread widely across both Armenian and Russian information environments, evolving into a broader discussion on possible Russian intelligence influence. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to the publication, stating that the purpose of The Insider’s report was “to intimidate Armenian society on the eve of elections.” The MFA further argued that in Armenia a narrative environment is forming in which any contact between opposition figures or public actors critical of the government and Russian counterparts is portrayed as activity “under the auspices of Russian special services.”
Another key direction of the narrative concerned Armenia’s foreign policy orientation. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan stated that Yerevan understands that membership in the EAEU and the EU are “incompatible,” while simultaneously emphasizing that Armenia does not intend to “divorce any partner” and seeks to avoid escalation in Armenia–Russia relations.
3. Existential Threat (352 publications) – Elections are increasingly framed for the public as a decisive, existential turning point. Analytical content on YouTube and short-form TikTok videos was heavily saturated with warnings about the potential loss of statehood, aiming to maximize emotional voter mobilization.
The remaining seven narrative analyses:
4. Borders and Trade (351 publications)– The narrative primarily focused on the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations and discussions surrounding the potential opening of borders. The Azerbaijani Ambassador to Ankara, Rashad Mammadov, stated that “the Armenian-Turkish border will be opened after the June 7 parliamentary elections, once the process of constitutional amendments in Armenia is completed.” He further noted that “the Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization processes are developing in parallel.” During the week, attention was also drawn to the first joint meeting in Yerevan of the Armenia-Turkey commission on the joint use of the waters of the Akhuryan and Araks rivers. Tigran Vardanyan, Director of “Jrar” CJSC, stated that the agreements reached were based on “mutually beneficial terms.” The meeting was presented as an example of expanding practical cooperation between the two countries.
5. Elections and CEC (316 publications) – A wide public response was generated by a recording published by Arman Tatoyan, according to which students at the Armavir regional college were being pressured to participate in the Civil Contract Party’s campaign activities. Tatoyan stated that individuals were subjected to coercion “some are told they will fail exams, others that they will be dismissed from their jobs” and emphasized that responsibility should be borne by “those who sponsor the scheme.”
One of the key directions of the narrative became the issue of a video circulated by masked individuals issuing threats. Ishkhan Saghatelyan claimed that Pashinyan “himself produced” the video showing masked Artsakh Armenians threatening the Prime Minister, and that it is being used to level accusations against the opposition.
The most tense developments were linked to proceedings involving Andranik Tevanyan, second on the electoral list of the “Prosperous Armenia” bloc. During the campaign, Pashinyan stated that the NSS would submit a report to the Investigative Committee with the expectation of initiating a criminal case on charges of treason. Tevanyan was subsequently detained for two months.
During the week, attention was also drawn to the “I Am Against Everyone” party. The withdrawal of 50 out of 87 candidates was presented as a legal mechanism facilitating the future renunciation of mandates.
6. Energy and Infrastructure (314 publications) – Particular attention in the information space was drawn to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statement regarding the nationalization of the “Ararat Cement” plant. Pashinyan announced that the “Guloyan -Tsarukyan mafia machinations have been exposed” and that the plant is subject to nationalization. He further stated that, as in the case of Electric Networks of Armenia, a state-appointed administrator would be installed, and called on employees no longer to follow instructions from previous owners. Gagik Tsarukyan responded that the plant was acquired legally and that the government’s actions are politically motivated.
A separate line of discussion concerned the issue of a possible increase in gas prices. Pashinyan stated that “there can be no gas price increase,” as a mutually beneficial agreement is in place. The topic gained momentum following media reports suggesting that Gazprom had approached the Armenian government regarding a price revision, which was officially denied.
During the week, attention was also drawn to statements on regional railway communications. Pashinyan declared that the Akhalkalaki-Kars railway is “now open for exports from Armenia and imports into Armenia,” presenting it as an important economic development.
7. Armed Forces (280 publications) – On May 21, an artificial spike was recorded (105 items), driven by videos circulating online. In one video shared by a member of the “Strong Armenia” party, it was claimed that an Armenian military position in the Jermuk sector had been surrendered. The official response classified the information as disinformation, and law enforcement bodies were urged to examine the video and the statements it contained for legal assessment.
The Minister of High-Tech Industry, Mkhitar Hayrapetyan, announced that Armenian-made weapons had been exported abroad for the first time, with volumes reaching millions of dollars. In the information space, this was presented as an important milestone in the development of Armenia’s domestic defense industry and the expansion of military exports.
8. Europe and Armenia (264 items) – In Russian-language Telegram channels, claims circulated that the West continues to support Nikol Pashinyan while ignoring alleged pressure against the opposition, the Church, and critics of the authorities in Armenia. The themes of “European values” and “democracy” were framed as superficial, while Western support was portrayed as driven by political interests.
9. Church and State (224 publications) – Samvel Karapetyan’s statement became central to the narrative, according to which, prior to his arrest, he was allegedly offered that he publicly declare “we will not protect the Church,” after which, he claims, “both the Electric Networks and everything else would be returned.” Karapetyan stated that he refused this offer. This statement was presented in the information space as evidence of political and economic pressure related to the Church.
At the same time, Edmond Marukyan stated that “this insidious campaign against the Church will be stopped,” arguing that Nikol Pashinyan has “lost the struggle against the Church.”
10. Peace and TRIPP (223 publications) – The U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Armenia, David Allen, stated that negotiations related to the TRIPP project are ongoing.
2.2. Narrative Intersection Analysis
This week, the most notable intersections were observed among the “Discrediting of Opponents,” “Elections and CEC,” and “External Influence” narratives. Political confrontation was frequently framed not only as an internal struggle but also as a process shaped by external actors. A key example was the developments surrounding Andranik Tevanyan, where allegations raised within the electoral context were simultaneously linked to themes of “foreign intelligence services” and “state treason.” This convergence was further reinforced by The Insider’s publication regarding Samvel Karapetyan, according to which his passport file reportedly listed the “FSB Information Center” (“ИЦ ФСБ”) in the “place of employment” field. As a result, discussions around political and electoral processes were often accompanied by claims related to “Russian influence,” “agent networks,” and external interference.
Strong intersections were also observed between the “Energy and Infrastructure” and “Church and State” narratives. Samvel Karapetyan’s statement that he was allegedly offered the possibility of publicly refusing to defend the Church in exchange for the Electric Networks of Armenia and other assets connected the Church-related discourse with issues of economic and infrastructural control. At the same time, discussions surrounding the nationalization of “Ararat Cement” were also framed not only in economic terms but within a broader context of political influence and confrontation.
2.3. Platform Analysis
- Telegram (1,233 publications) – This was the most active platform during the monitoring period, where the “Energy and Infrastructure,” “Borders and Trade,” and “External Influence” narratives predominated. The platform was mainly used for оператив and rapid-response publications.
- Facebook (891) – Most active in the discussion of the “Discrediting of Opponents” and “Elections and CEC” narratives. The platform continued to serve as one of the main arenas for political debate and reciprocal accusations.
- YouTube (616) – Analytical content prevailed, particularly around the “Existential Threat” and “External Influence” narratives.
- TikTok (309) – Primarily used for short-form, emotional, and viral content related to the “Discrediting of Opponents” narrative and electoral themes.
2.4. Actor Analysis
- Armenian media platforms and news outlets – Continued to shape the core of the information agenda by disseminating both official statements and analytical as well as political content.
- Anonymous and/or unidentified information sources – Became particularly active around crisis-sensitive and sensitive topics, especially on Telegram, rapidly circulating unverified or contested information.
- Political actors and stakeholders – Actively used social media platforms to advance the “Discrediting of Opponents” and “Elections and CEC” narratives, directly engaging with their audiences and distributing emotionally charged and polarizing messages.
3. Temporal Dynamics
| Narrative | 18.05 | 19.05 | 20.05 | 21.05 | 22.05 | 23.05 | 24.05 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Discrediting of Opponents | 66 | 40 | 96 | 53 | 70 | 28 | 17 | 370 |
| 2. External Influence | 29 | 51 | 105 | 66 | 62 | 21 | 21 | 355 |
| 3. Existential Threat | 51 | 68 | 79 | 45 | 48 | 30 | 31 | 352 |
| 4. Borders and Trade | 31 | 47 | 50 | 61 | 46 | 16 | 100 | 351 |
| 5. Elections and CEC | 43 | 56 | 58 | 54 | 83 | 10 | 12 | 316 |
| 6. Energy and Infrastructure | 40 | 40 | 61 | 104 | 37 | 21 | 11 | 314 |
| 7. Armed Forces | 33 | 30 | 36 | 105 | 55 | 14 | 7 | 280 |
| 8. Europe and Armenia | 30 | 62 | 64 | 54 | 25 | 13 | 16 | 264 |
| 9. Church and State | 40 | 52 | 42 | 24 | 25 | 8 | 33 | 224 |
| 10. Peace and TRIPP | 20 | 17 | 32 | 38 | 21 | 23 | 72 | 223 |
| TOTAL | 383 | 463 | 623 | 604 | 472 | 184 | 320 | 3049 |
4. Conclusions and Key Findings
- The intensification of the “Foreign Influence” narrative on May 20 demonstrated that, within the pre-election competition, allegations linking political actors to external powers have become one of the primary mechanisms of political discreditation. Various actors framed one another as serving the interests of Russia, the West, or other external centres, thereby attempting to erode public trust and undermine the legitimacy of their opponents.
- Throughout the week, a further deepening of emotionalization in political discourse became evident. The prevalence of offensive rhetoric, threatening videos circulated during the campaign, and polarizing discourse around the Church indicate that political actors are increasingly adapting to the communicative logic of social media, where conflict-driven, emotional, and provocative content tends to achieve the highest reach and engagement.
- The consistently high levels of the “Existential Threat” narrative (a total of 352 items, particularly on YouTube) suggest that the campaign is largely framed not as a programmatic competition, but as a consequential choice between the preservation or loss of statehood. This framing contributes to the amplification of public fears and perceptions of uncertainty.
The monitoring was conducted by the “Media Diversity Institute” (MDI) informational NGO.
The report was developed in accordance with the methodology for monitoring the 2026 parliamentary elections in the Republic of Armenia. Data collection and report generation were carried out using AI-powered tools: the Letsdata digital monitoring tool was used for collecting primary source data, while Claude, NotebookLM, and Gemini were used for report generation.
The analysis is based on a pre-selected list of 250 sources (i.e., actors). The process was accompanied by professional oversight, involving a monitoring specialist and a data collection specialist, to ensure reliability.
