In the lead-up to the 2026 parliamentary elections
Fact-Checking and FIMI Monitoring Mission
In the lead-up to the 2026 parliamentary elections, we collaborate with the inFact fact-checking network in Armenia and PopUp Newsroom, supporting media outlets in conducting fact-checking and countering disinformation and hybrid warfare narratives. At the same time, we continuously monitor Armenia’s information environment and publish weekly reports analyzing emerging narratives, trends, and developments.
- Trainings for journalists
- Digital security support
- Digital Infrastructure support
- Fact-Checking and Verification
- Monitoring reports
- Communication with international diplomatic missions

Monitoring Methodology
The monitoring was conducted by the Media Diversity Institute.
1. Purpose of the Monitoring
The purpose of the monitoring is to examine the Armenian information environment and its development trends in the context of the 2026 parliamentary elections.
The study focuses on mapping messages that may influence the electoral process and identifying patterns in their dissemination.
The monitoring primarily focuses on quantitative data related to information circulation, which helps reveal the dynamics of topics, their significance, and the scope of their influence.
2. Methodology
Within the framework of the monitoring, 10 thematic directions were developed, representing the most visible and widely discussed developments in Armenia. These themes take into account regional developments, Armenia’s role in international relations, and social, political, economic, human rights, and democracy related events taking place at the domestic level.
During the monitoring process, the following factors related to the 10 thematic directions were collected and analyzed on a weekly basis:
Dissemination trends, including levels of activity, decline, and fluctuations
The platforms through which the messages were circulated
The actors who published or promoted these messages
Each week’s report was compared with results from previous periods, highlighting trends and patterns in the overall information environment.
The weekly monitoring results assessed:
A) Which thematic direction or narrative was the most active
B) Which actors most frequently disseminated these narratives
C) Whether there was an increase or decrease in the volume of dissemination
D) On which platforms the circulation of narratives was most concentrated
The results of the monitoring are presented in the form of weekly analytical brief reports, ensuring temporal comparability and enabling the observation of trends and dynamics over time.
2.1. Monitoring Framework
The monitoring is based on 10 predefined narratives:
Armed Forces – Messages that portray the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia negatively or attempt to discredit them.
Borders and Trade – Claims related to Armenia’s borders, import export dynamics, and economic dependence.
Church and State – Narratives surrounding the relationship between the Armenian Apostolic Church and the government.
Elections and the Central Election Commission – Claims expressing distrust toward the electoral process and the Central Election Commission or alleging election fraud.
Energy and Infrastructure – Disinformation claims related to electricity networks, energy security, and infrastructure.
Europe and Armenia – Narratives concerning European institutions and the role of the European Union.
Existential Threat – Claims presenting the election of a particular political force as an existential threat to the state or national security.
Foreign Influence – Messages portraying political actors or parties as agents of foreign influence.
Peace and TRIPP – Narratives related to the peace process and the so called “Trump route”.
Discrediting Opponents – Narratives aimed at discrediting political opponents, accusing them of crimes, treason, or conspiracies.
2.2. Data Collection
The data was collected using the LetsData digital monitoring tool. The analysis is based on a predefined list of 250 selected sources (actors), which includes:
Armenian media actors and media outlets (95)
Anonymous and or unidentified information websites
Political figures, political parties, political actors, and affiliated individuals, including representatives of the Government of Armenia (39), members of the National Assembly (49), candidates in the parliamentary elections, and representatives of extra parliamentary political forces (66)
Data was collected from four platforms: Facebook, YouTube, Telegram, and TikTok. During the monitoring process, both Armenian language and Russian language publications were analyzed.
2.3. Clategorization
The collected publications were categorized according to the thematic directions mentioned above, based on the content they addressed and their main message. Publications that contained more than one narrative and or thematic direction were accordingly included in multiple categories.
2.4. Timeframe
Start of monitoring: February 1, 2026
Publication of monitoring results: weekly reports
End of monitoring: June 30, 2026
2.5. Data Quality Assurance
The data quality assurance process aimed to maintain the accuracy and completeness of the information collected during the monitoring.
In all cases, the automated data collection and report preparation were carried out using artificial intelligence powered tools.
The LetsData digital monitoring tool was used for collecting data from primary sources, while Claude, NotebookLM, and Gemini were used for generating the reports.
The combined use of these tools made it possible to process large volumes of data, ensuring both the speed of data processing and the efficiency of the analysis. The automated collection process was complemented by human oversight to further verify the reliability of the data.
2.6. Data Archiving and Storage
All collected and processed data were organized and stored in a secure digital environment with restricted access. Archiving was carried out according to a predefined structure, ensuring the possibility of future use, comparative analysis, and data referencing.
Weekly Reports
If there are no materials available in the English section of the website, please refer to the Armenian version using automatic translation.
Fact-Checking materials
February
Russian network pushes AI torture claims and fake PACE resolution about Armenia |
Abortion Ban Claim in Armenia Is False, AI-Generated Video Misuses CivilNet Logo |
Alleged Incident Between Vice President Vance and a French Officer: Fake News Targeting Macron |
“Atomic” Passions: false narratives used to target Armenia–U.S. Energy Cooperation |
Disinformation about Armenia on X platform under the guise of the French Le Point news magazine |
March
Fake news campaign targets Armenia using CNN, Reuters, and Bloomberg logos |
An “American” Newspaper From Moscow: Who Brings the Wyoming Star to Armenia? |
Phishing Attack via Fake Offer Sent Under the Name of Civil Contract: CSO-s Targeted |
Russian and pro-Russian channels share unsubstantiated information about the military base in Gyumri |
Belarusian Telegram Channel Targets the Pashinyan-Macron Meeting |
Sounds of Gunfire Heard in Kapan and “Iranian Strikes in Nagorno-Karabakh” |
Aliyev’s Remarks on Flights Over the “Zangezur Corridor” Airspace Are Not New |
The Iran War and Manipulations on TRIPP: Facts vs Propaganda |
France Has Not Allocated €30 Million to Armenia to Distance It From Russia |
April
From election rigging to foreign influence: narratives ahead of elections in Armenia |
Reports That Pashinyan Is Selling Armenia’s Agriculture to Turkey Are Fake |
“Bringers of War”?: What Opposition Forces Are Saying About Peace |
MediaNews’s “public opinion,” fake faces, and a possible link to Taron Chakhoyan |
Azerbaijan’s Name Was Not Recently Added to e-auctions.am: Narek Karapetyan’s Claim Is Incorrect |
Hate Speech Spares No One: How Street Polls Have Turned Into a Tool of Digital Violence |
The “Secret” Letter Circulated Under the Name of the Tourism Committee Head Is Fake |
May
Public TV Did Not Cover Armenia’s 16-Place Decline in the Press Freedom Index |
Armenia’s Agriculture Targeted by Fake News: What Was Actually Signed at the 8th EPC Summit |
Does the EU Hold Summits in Countries Facing “Difficult Choices”? |
Cash in Suitcases at the Border, Billions in Online Crypto: Shadow Financing of the Elections |
Fake Identities, Criminal Past, Kremlin Narratives: The New Issue of Wyoming Star |
Fake story claiming Pashinyan HIV diagnosis spread using CivilNet branding |
New Claims by a Turkish Journalist and a Network of Deception Regarding the Return of Azerbaijanis |
Claims Regarding Pashinyan’s Campaign Financing and Pension Cuts Are Fake |
“Leaked Documents” Without Evidence: Who Is Behind Khronika Kavkaza? |
67,000+ Posts, Thousands of Channels, and the Same Text: The “$3.4 Million” Fake Network |
Russia’s “Matryoshka” is spreading deepfakes that contain calls to kill Pashinyan |
If there are no materials available in the English section of the website, please refer to the Armenian version using automatic translation.


