Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) Trends in Armenia’s Information Environment – June 2026

1. Overview

In June 2026, Armenia’s information environment was shaped by one pivotal event: June 7 parliamentary elections. The vote took place against the backdrop of foreign-policy realignments: Yerevan’s relations with Moscow continued to deteriorate, while rapprochement with the European Union had become the government’s declared course. It was precisely within this field of tension that foreign information manipulation (FIMI) received its main framing: the elections were presented to target audiences not as a domestic political contest, but as a “civilizational choice” between Russia/the EAEU and the West/the EU.

The special report on the parliamentary elections is available at this link.

The methodological framework of this study is based on the European External Action Service (EEAS) FIMI framework and the DISARM matrix, combined with the approaches developed by the Media Diversity Institute (MDI) and adapted to the specific characteristics of the cases examined. This approach enables the analysis to focus not merely on content, but on the specific behaviours, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed in information attacks.

Over the course of the month, the movement of narratives went through three distinct phases. In the pre-election period, preemptive delegitimizing messages predominated, with the results being cast into doubt even before the vote. On election day, the emphasis shifted to the search for evidence of “foreign interference,” while in the post-election phase an agenda of non-recognition of the results and “repressions against the opposition” took shape, joined by official Russian spokespersons.

“The West is interfering in the elections.” Sweden’s democracy-support funding was presented as evidence of interference¹, the EU ambassador’s visit to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) as a suspicious presence², and organizations working with Western foundations as an “anti-Russian ecosystem³”. In a more developed version, claims were made that, if necessary, the EU could cancel an unfavorable result “under the Romanian scenario⁴”. After the elections, this line was cemented by the Russian Foreign Ministry’s official assessment⁵: the elections took place under “unprecedented pressure” on the opposition and Western interference.

Imposing a dilemma and economic conditionality. A series of statements by Maria Zakharova formed the “two chairs” message: Armenia must clearly choose between the EAEU and the EU⁶, and, should it take the European path, Russia will not maintain preferential terms⁷. The message was reinforced along the line of economic fears: the EU market was presented as an inadequate replacement⁸ for the Russian one, and the West’s interest in Armenia as a program of “appropriating” resources⁹.

Transposing scenario fears. A persistent device was describing Armenia’s future through other countries’ “scenarios”: The “Georgian warning¹⁰” came through the words of a Georgian politician, the European path was equated with “Ukrainian and Moldovan upheavals¹¹”, and the “Belarusian scenario¹²” was offered as a positive alternative. This construction leaves the audience with a choice only between variants of failure and integration with Moscow.

The spiritual-cultural axis. The claim spread by the SVR (Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service) that the EU demands Yerevan sever its “religious-spiritual ties¹³” with Russia, and that Western NGOs are targeting the priest of the 102nd military base in Gyumri, moved the narrative into the field of discussions about loss of identity: the EU is presented as a force cutting Armenia off from Russia not only politically but also at the spiritual-cultural level, exploiting the existing church–state tension.

Delegitimization of the results. Even before the vote, Russian media were calling for not recognizing the results¹⁴ in the event of fraud; on election day, claims of “mass violations¹⁵” were in circulation, and the recount was presented as the CEC “painting¹⁶” the numbers. In the post-election phase the line was raised to the official level: Medvedev characterized Armenia as a country passing under Western control¹⁷, and the question of Gagik Tsarukyan’s immunity as a “new repression¹⁸”. This delegitimizing frame closely overlapped with domestic opposition rhetoric, ensuring the localization of the narrative without additional effort.

The field was not one-sided. Ukrainian and pro-Western sources were, in parallel, forming a mirror frame, presenting Russia as a party preparing hybrid attacks ¹⁹and having made an attempt to exert influence through²⁰ the diaspora.

The following sections present the details of selected cases.

PART 2. STUDY OF KEY FIMI CASES

Case 1 – The campaign alleging electoral fraud and non-recognition of the results

Database: ~10 publications (Telegram + websites). This refers only to the volume of cases examined within the monitoring framework.

1. Context

On election night, against the backdrop of the CEC’s publication of the results, certain channels circulated “electoral fraud” narratives, portraying the CEC as a body that “paints numbers” for the authorities.

• Primary objective: to delegitimize the election results.
• Risk assessment: high,increases the risk of post-election destabilization
• Target audience: citizens who distrust the electoral process

2. Trigger and launch of the campaign

The trigger was the fact that the CEC summarized and published the election results on the morning of June 8: this was immediately presented²¹ as an attempt to buy time to “paint the numbers correctly,” and during the night the “union of painters” label attached to the CEC was circulated, with the wording “Moldovan scenario, Moldovan numbers²²”.

3. The ecosystem of actors

• Originators: the main messages casting doubt on the legitimacy of the elections spread from the statements²³ of opposition political leaders.
• Amplifiers: the thesis quickly gained wide circulation across a number of Telegram channels, including @mikayelbad, @ArmenianVendetta, @ArchZang, @tertammedia, @Davit_Grigoryan_Live, @sisumasis, @dirqapah, @news7or, and others. Analysis of the posts shows that the same wordings and claims were reposted across several channels almost unchanged and synchronously, minutes apart.

4. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs — DISARM)

• Coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB): the “CEC union of painters” text and figures were reposted simultaneously in several Telegram channels, with the same “Moldovan numbers, one by one” ending.
• Delegitimization (Discredit the Process): the CEC’s actions were presented²⁴ as deliberate manipulation of the election results, casting doubt on the transparency of the process and the credibility of the results: “For 13 hours the CEC has been unable to count – the most shameful election since 1996, with zero legitimacy.”

5. Countermeasures

The OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission recorded²⁵ that voters had been provided with the opportunity to make a genuine and pluralistic choice. At the same time, the Constitutional Court rejected²⁶ the applications seeking to invalidate the election results, leaving the CEC’s decision in force.

Case 2. AI-generated deepfakes, hybrid and cyber operations around the elections

Database: ~11 publications, covering June 4-7 and 24-30. This refers only to the volume of cases examined within the monitoring framework.

1. Context

In parallel with content-based narratives, direct operational interference was recorded around the election, targeting voter behavior and Armenia’s information infrastructure; at the end of June, FIMI also manifested itself in a technologically more sophisticated form – AI-generated content, as well as disinformation directed against the construction of an AI factory in Armenia.

• Primary objective: in the short term, to reduce electoral turnout and trust, and to create a sense of chaos and loss of security; in the long term, to distort the information environment and artificial intelligence sources with pro-Russian narratives and to undermine trust in specific institutions and projects.
• Risk assessment: high, direct impact on the physical and digital aspects of the electoral process; at the same time, the impact extends beyond social networks into the layer of search engines and artificial intelligence.
• Target audience: citizens eligible to vote (especially citizens arriving from Russia), users of artificial intelligence tools, and the investment and technology community.

2. Trigger and launch of the campaign

The trigger for the first wave was the approach of the election: threatening calls and emails from foreign and unknown virtual numbers became active²⁷ (created outside Armenia, per the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ confirmation), along with claims of the incumbent authorities’ “attempts to intimidate²⁸” citizens arriving from Russia with a 25-day military training call-up, and the sowing of doubts about the secrecy of the ballot. At the end of June the technological layer of the campaign became visible through two revelations: Bloomberg²⁹ and ZN.UA³⁰ published material on the Kremlin-linked Social Design Agency (SDA), which was preparing operations in Armenia, while Factor.am exposed³¹ a fake earthquake-prediction video directed against the AI center (Firebird) in Armenia.

3. The ecosystem of actors

• Originators: anonymous/foreign operators (virtual numbers, addresses created outside Armenia), fake hacker personas, the Kremlin-linked “SDA” agency, and the Russian Storm-1516 group.
• Amplifiers: social media users and Telegram channels amplifying the fear message; fake news websites, Wikipedia clones, a fake domain imitating TechCrunch (tech-crunch.org), and YouTube channels.

4. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs – DISARM)

• Direct intimidation: politically charged threatening calls and emails³² and the threat ³³of a military call-up, aimed at changing voter behavior.
• Fake institution: fake actors³⁴ posing as a hacker team, who used emails to frighten people with data leaks; imitation of a reputable media outlet (TechCrunch) via a fake domain³⁵; and AI-generated experts, a fake earthquake video directed against the Firebird AI center (Storm-1516).
• Cyberattack: a DDoS wave against Armenia’s Public Television and internet infrastructure (see the statement³⁶).
• Repositioning of search and artificial intelligence systems: the SDA plan³⁷ — fake news websites and ~200,000 Wikipedia-clone pages to mislead search engines and AI chatbots; in April 2026, ahead of the elections, an Armenian wiki-clone with pro-Russian narratives was planned (three resources were identified and blocked by hosting providers).

5. Countermeasures

The countermeasures unfolded at several levels. The Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a public warning, advising people not to engage, to block the numbers, and not to respond to threatening messages; some channels explained³⁸ the technical impossibility of determining who voted for whom, countering the fear campaign. The cases in the technological layer were exposed through investigative journalism: Bloomberg/ZN.UA via the leak of the SDA documents, and Factor.TV via the dismantling of the fake “earthquake” video (fake domain, AI voice, attribution to Storm-1516). The Armenian wiki-clone resources were blocked by the hosting provider.

Case 3 – European integration as an existential threat (church, economy, sovereignty)

Database: ~9 publications (Telegram + web). This refers only to the volume of cases examined within the monitoring framework.

1. Context

The electoral choice was presented as an existential threat: integration with the European Union = the loss of identity, church, economy, and sovereignty – “down Ukraine’s tragic path.”

• Primary objective: to present the EU not only as a political, but also as a spiritual-cultural and economic threat.
• Risk assessment: medium,it touches sensitive layers of identity and faith.
• Target audience: conservative, religious, and economically vulnerable groups (farmers, businesses dependent on the Russian market).

2. Campaign Trigger and Launch

The strongest trigger was the statement³⁹ by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service claiming that the EU is “pushing out” the Russian Orthodox Church from Armenia as a “mandatory condition” of European integration, demanding the severing of “centuries-old religious-spiritual ties” (the same thesis was being spread⁴⁰ via various channels⁴¹). In parallel, claims were circulating ⁴²about the “handover” of rare metals to the US “as the price of sovereignty.”

3. The ecosystem of actors

Originators: the source of the information wave was the official statement⁴³ from Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, which also leveled accusations at the EU and the civil society organizations it supports, presenting them as instruments of anti-Russian policy.

Amplifiers: these theses gained wide circulation in Russian media, in particular on the Zvezda (Звезда) and PolitNavigator (ПолитНавигатор) platforms, as well as in a number of Telegram channels: @ArmAgr, @hayspaigrarumner, @bditelnost, @mikayelbad, @alphanewsam, and @enabludatel.

4. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs – DISARM)

• Religious framing (Wedge): the EU is presented ⁴⁴as an actor aiming to limit the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Armenia and to sever the centuries-old Armenian-Russian spiritual and religious ties, thereby deepening societal dividing lines.
• Economic fear (Fearmongering): the thesis⁴⁵ was spread that the EU market cannot replace the Russian one, especially in the context of agricultural exports, which is presented as a substantial economic risk for Armenia’s economy and exporters in the event of European integration.
• The “Ukrainization” frame and source laundering: posts list⁴⁶ the organizations operating in Armenia (USAID, NED, Freedom House…) as “evidence” of “anti-Russian influence.” In a number of publications, developments in Armenia are presented⁴⁷ as a repetition of the “Ukrainian scenario,” emphasizing government pressure, Western influence, and the danger of weakening ties with Russia.

Case 4. Projecting Armenia’s post-election future through the Georgian and other scenarios

Database: ~155 posts related to the topic from 21 channels, ~7.5 million views (June 2026). This refers only to the volume of cases examined within the monitoring framework.

1. Context

On the eve of the June 7 parliamentary elections, and especially after them, pro-Russian and anti-Western Telegram networks began to mold Armenia’s future on the Georgian scenario, presenting the failure of Georgia’s European integration as a repetition inevitably awaiting Yerevan. The skeleton of the narrative consists of four links: European integration → the severing of ties with Russia and economic war → color revolution / external governance → “the EU will not admit Armenia anyway, or will admit it as a second-class country.” The channels observed turn the experience of Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova into a frightening mirror in which the Armenian citizen is supposed to see his predetermined future.

• Primary objective: to delegitimize Armenia’s post-election government and Western orientation, shaping post-election fatalism (“whatever you choose, it will end up like Georgia”) and justifying Russia’s punitive steps (the ban on agri-food imports, the threat of pushing Armenia out of the EAEU).
• Risk assessment: high, synchronized, multi-channel amplification (the same text spread through several channels in a single day), large reach (individual posts: 170,000–290,000 views), and the linking of real economic obstacles (the Upper Lars congestion, bans) to the political message, which raises credibility.
• Target audience: citizens eligible to vote who oppose the incumbent government, the Armenian community and voters residing in Russia, as well as Russia’s domestic audience.

2. Trigger and launch of the campaign

The key trigger was Russia’s phased ban on Armenian agri-food products⁴⁸ (late May – June), accompanied by a multi-kilometer traffic jam at Upper Lars: Telegram channels presented this as “the price of breaking with Russia”, for example, through Georgian politician Mamuka Pipia’s message⁴⁹ “Armenians, do not repeat our mistakes.” The second trigger was the elections themselves: the fact that Nikol Pashinyan declared victory when only 3-10% of the votes had been counted became the basis for the “fake plebiscite” frame. The third trigger consisted of foreign-policy symbols – the US – Armenia strategic partnership and the memorandum on mineral resources, the Eagle Partner-2026 exercises, and the EU’s compensation package; these were served up as proof⁵⁰ of “external governance”.

3. The ecosystem of actors

• Originators: the main producer of long analytical formats is @tzitzak, which shapes the framing texts, from the piece “A golden cage for Yerevan⁵¹” to “The Moldovan scenario⁵²”. The Caucasus analytical frame is provided by @caucasar, which formulates the templates of “double standards” and “futile American integration,” for example in the publication “A bear’s favor: how the EU is preparing to save Armenia⁵³”. “Expert” legitimacy is lent by Russian commentators (Suslov, Zakharova), for example, in Dmitry Suslov’s interview⁵⁴, with the wording “if Armenia chooses the EU, the consequences must come now.”
• Amplifiers: the most active reproducers are the channels @parallel95, @mikayelbad, @Im_Hayastan, @rusyerevantoday, @lizahatson, and @armsens, which repost the same material almost simultaneously; for example, the Zinc Network “conspiracy” theme circulated through at least six channels, from armnewz⁵⁵ to Im_Hayastan’s⁵⁶ post⁵⁷“which intelligence services are carrying Pashinyan to victory?” The role of large-scale distribution is played by the major Russian channels @rybar, @dva_majors, and @SolovievLive.

4. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs – DISARM)

• False historical parallel: the core technique is the Georgia-Armenia equation: Saakashvili calls Yerevan a “new beacon of freedom,” “freedom versus slavery⁵⁸”, while Pashinyan, Saakashvili, and Zelensky are presented as “born of the same mother⁵⁹”. In parallel, the opposition is directly urged to “remember Georgia’s experience⁶⁰”.
• Sowing fear: every Western step is reframed as a threat: the Eagle Partner-2026 exercises are served up as a “rehearsal for a second front” and a “Caucasian cross⁶¹”, EU support as a “euro-illusion” that will not replace the Russian market⁶², while the collapse of record agricultural exports is presented⁶³through the contrast of “96 million roses versus 15 thousand.”
• The “Georgian voice”: to persuade the Armenian audience “from the inside,” the motif of a brotherly warning from Georgian pro-Russian political figures (Pipia, Papuashvili, Kobakhidze) is used, for example, Papuashvili’s thesis⁶⁴ that “the EU is silent about the arrests of Armenian oppositionists,” which is then “legitimized” by Caucasar⁶⁵ as “selective principledness.”
• The external-governance conspiracy: the electoral result is attributed to “London”, the Zinc Network/FCDO/MI6 network⁶⁶; Syunik and the mineral resources to an “American landing force⁶⁷”; while the “network of American biolaboratories in Transcaucasia⁶⁸” is presented as “visible” proof in the region, on the model of the Ukrainian “case.”
• Whataboutism + cherry-picking (double standards and selective data): the EU is accused of a “double game” (silence over the Armenian arrests), while the failure of “diversification” is “proven” through selective enumerations, for example, Moldova’s and Armenia’s “identical scenarios⁶⁹” and Medvedev’s “Georgia→Ukraine→Moldova→Armenia route” formula⁷⁰, which is reaffirmed by Medvedev’s claim that “the same thing is happening to Armenia as in Ukraine⁷¹”.
• Double standards and selective data: the essence of this technique lies in two devices: instead of answering an accusation, someone else’s “guilt” is pointed to (whataboutism), and only the facts that are convenient are selected (cherry-picking). The EU is accused of a “double game”, allegedly staying silent about the arrests in Armenia while condemning similar cases in other countries. Armenia’s policy of diversifying away from Russia is presented as a failure, relying only on selective comparisons: Moldova’s and Armenia’s “identical scenarios⁷²”, Medvedev’s “Georgia → Ukraine → Moldova → Armenia route” formula⁷³, which is repeated in his claim⁷⁴ that “the same thing is happening to Armenia as in Ukraine.”

URL Notice: Certain external URLs are intentionally defanged (e.g., example[.]com) for security and SEO purposes. This enables us to reference external resources, including potentially malicious, suspicious, or untrusted websites, without creating active hyperlinks or transferring SEO authority. To access a referenced URL, restore it to its original format.

The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and the Prague Civil Society Centre.

1. Source 1 — https://vz[.]ru/news/2026/6/7/1425379[.]html ↩︎
2. Source 2 — https://t[.]me/yerevan_speaks/52248  ↩︎
3. Source 3 — https://t[.]me/hayspaigrarumner/17893  ↩︎
4. Source 4 — https://t[.]me/ramzayiegokomanda/44304 ↩︎
5. Source 5 — https://am[.]sputniknews[.]ru/20260608/vybory-v-armenii-proshli-v-obstanovke-bespretsedentnogo-davleniya-na-oppozitsiyu—zakharova-103249574[.]html  ↩︎
6. Source 6 — https://t[.]me/anivarmenia/43070 ↩︎
7. Source 7 — https://t[.]me/anivarmenia/43078  ↩︎
8. Source 8 — https://t[.]me/enabludatel/3904  ↩︎
9. Source 9 — https://t[.]me/YerevanTodaynews/111981  ↩︎
10. Source 10 — https://t[.]me/alphanewsam/40142  ↩︎
11. Source 11 — https://inosmi[.]ru/20260611/armeniya-278858965[.]html  ↩︎
12. Source 12 — https://t[.]me/belvestnik/74887  ↩︎
13. Source 13 — https://tvzvezda[.]ru/news/2026631111-yzWPX[.]html  ↩︎
14. Source 14 — https://www[.]mk[.]ru/social/2026/06/04/eshhe-raz-o-lyubvi-o-sudbe-russkoarmyanskikh-otnosheniy-do-i-posle-vyborov-v-armenii[.]html  ↩︎
15. Source 15 -https://ukraina[.]ru/20260607/vybory-s-narusheniyami-itogi-7-iyunya-1079927513[.]html  ↩︎
16. Source 16 — https://t[.]me/ArmAgr/48260  ↩︎
17. Source 17 — https://t[.]me/rian_ru/341205  ↩︎
18. Source 18 — https://t[.]me/CompromatSNG/17031  ↩︎
19. Source 19 — https://uatv[.]ua/kurs-na-razryv-otnoshenyj-s-rossyej-armenyya-gotovytsya-k-gybrydnym-atakam-nakanune-vyborov-vydeo/  ↩︎
20. Source 20 — https://x[.]com/volodarskijo/status/2063705593165340791?s=51  ↩︎
21. Source 21 — https://t[.]me/mikayelbad/47901  ↩︎
22. Source 22 — https://t[.]me/mikayelbad/47905  ↩︎
23. Source 23 — https://www[.]facebook[.]com/watch/?v=1133576086510877  ↩︎
24. Source 24 — https://t[.]me/ArmenianVendetta/48514  ↩︎
25. Source 25 — https://hetq[.]am/hy/article/181949  ↩︎
26. Source 26 — https://www[.]azatutyun[.]am/a/sd-n-merzhets-yntroutyounneri-ardyounknern-anvaver-chanachelou-dimoumnern-ou-ouzhi-mej-toghets-kyh-oroshoumy/33796703[.]html ↩︎
27. Source 27 — https://t[.]me/panarmeniannet/42125  ↩︎
28. Source 28 — https://t[.]me/armtoday/103247  ↩︎
29. Source 29 — https://www[.]bloomberg[.]com/news/features/2026-06-23/leaked-files-show-russia-s-plan-to-influence-ai-and-search-results  ↩︎
30. Source 30 — https://zn.ua/TECHNOLOGIES/fejkovye-smi-i-klony-vikipedii-rossija-pytaetsja-povlijat-na-ii-i-poiskovye-sistemy-bloomberg.html ↩︎
31. Source 31 — https://factor[.]am/1034854[.]html  ↩︎
32. Source 32 — https://t[.]me/panarmeniannet/42125  ↩︎
33. Source 33 — https://t[.]me/armtoday/103247   ↩︎
34. Source 34 — https://media[.]am/hy/critique/2026/04/15/45726/   ↩︎
35. Source 35 — https://factor[.]am/1034854[.]html  ↩︎
36. Source 36 — https://www[.]facebook[.]com/photo/?fbid=122268539384179956&set=a[.]122117162132179956  ↩︎
37. Source 37 — https://www[.]bloomberg[.]com/news/features/2026-06-23/leaked-files-show-russia-s-plan-to-influence-ai-and-search-results  ↩︎
38. Source 38 — https://t[.]me/bagramyan26/97492  ↩︎
39. Source 39 — http://svr[.]gov[.]ru/smi/2026/06/evroantikhristy-natselilis-na-russkuyu-pravoslavnuyu-tserkov-v-armenii[.]htm  ↩︎
40. Source 40 — https://t[.]me/ArmAgr/47964  ↩︎
41. Source 41 — https://tvzvezda[.]ru/news/2026631111-yzWPX[.]html  ↩︎
42. Source 42 — https://t[.]me/mikayelbad/47667  ↩︎
43. Source 43 — http://svr[.]gov[.]ru/smi/2026/06/evroantikhristy-natselilis-na-russkuyu-pravoslavnuyu-tserkov-v-armenii[.]htm   ↩︎
44. Source 44 — https://t[.]me/ArmAgr/47964  ↩︎
45. Source 45 — https://t[.]me/enabludatel/3904  ↩︎
46. Source 46 — https://t[.]me/hayspaigrarumner/17893  ↩︎
47. Source 47 — https://politnavigator[.]net/vsjo-kak-na-ukraine-pashinyan-zapustil-katok-repressijj-grantoedy-travlyu-neugodnykh[.]html  ↩︎
48. Source 48 — https://civilnet[.]am/hy/news/1012456  ↩︎
49. Source 49 — https://t[.]me/mikayelbad/47655  ↩︎
50. Source 50 – https://t[.]me/tzitzak/21296 ↩︎
51. Source 51 — https://t[.]me/tzitzak/21290  ↩︎
52. Source 52- https://t[.]me/tzitzak/21703  ↩︎
53. Source 53 — https://t[.]me/caucasar/1910  ↩︎
54. Source 54- https://t[.]me/armsens/64874  ↩︎
55. Source 55 — https://t[.]me/armnewz/21468  ↩︎
56. Source 56 — https://t[.]me/Im_Hayastan/70480  ↩︎
57. Source 57- https://t[.]me/Im_Hayastan/70480  ↩︎
58. Source 59 — https://t[.]me/SolovievLive/371981  ↩︎
59. Source 60 — https://t[.]me/rusyerevantoday/96914  ↩︎
60. Source 61 — https://t[.]me/tzitzak/21494  ↩︎
61. Source 62 — https://t[.]me/tzitzak/21508  ↩︎
62. Source 61 — https://t[.]me/tzitzak/21494  ↩︎
63. Source 63 — https://t[.]me/tzitzak/21499  ↩︎
64. Source 64 — https://t[.]me/parallel95/115356  ↩︎
65. Source 65 — https://t[.]me/caucasar/1862  ↩︎
66. Source 66 — https://t[.]me/armnewz/21468  ↩︎
67. Source 67 — https://t[.]me/Im_Hayastan/70738   ↩︎
68. Source 68 — https://t[.]me/caucasar/1887  ↩︎
69. Source 69 — https://t[.]me/parallel95/115336  ↩︎
70. Source 70 — https://t[.]me/SolovievLive/374278  ↩︎
71. Source 71 — https://t[.]me/rusyerevantoday/97531  ↩︎
72. Source 72 — https://t[.]me/parallel95/115336  ↩︎
73. Source 73 — https://t[.]me/SolovievLive/374278  ↩︎
74. Source 74 — https://t[.]me/rusyerevantoday/97531  ↩︎