Trends in Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) in Armenia’s Information Environment – Pre-Election Campaign and Electoral Process, 2026

This special report examines trends in Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) during the run-up to Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections. It covers the period from 7 May to 7 June 2026, focusing on FIMI campaigns, the tactical elements characteristic of such activities, and the circulation of key narratives throughout the reporting period.

The methodological framework of this study is based on the European External Action Service (EEAS) FIMI framework and the DISARM matrix, combined with the approaches developed by the Media Diversity Institute (MDI) and adapted to the specific characteristics of the cases examined. This approach enables the analysis to focus not merely on content, but on the specific behaviours, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed in information attacks.

Part 1. Context Analysis

In May 2026, with the launch of Armenia’s parliamentary election campaign, Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) activities intensified significantly. Russian- and Azerbaijani-language sources targeted Armenia’s domestic and foreign policy developments, exploiting current events to introduce manipulative narratives aligned with their strategic objectives.

The information campaigns were primarily built around several core narratives portraying Armenia’s foreign policy diversification and closer engagement with the West as a loss of sovereignty and an existential threat to the country.

Donald Trump’s public support for Nikol Pashinyan and the agreement ¹ signed with the United States were manipulated by Russian-language Telegram channels, which circulated claims² that “Armenia was being deprived of Russian military and economic support” and that “the country’s minerals and natural resources were being handed over to the Americans”.

At the same time, topics originating in the Azerbaijani media space, such as the possible deployment of “Azerbaijani peacekeepers” in Armenia or statements³ regarding the “return of 300,000 Azerbaijanis,” were rapidly transferred into and localized within Armenia’s domestic political discourse, where they were used to accuse the incumbent authorities of betrayal and of compromising the country’s national interests.

A particularly prominent element of the election campaign was a video⁴ circulated online in which masked and armed individuals issued assassination threats against Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Pashinyan himself accused the individuals of being “illegal mercenaries,” while law enforcement authorities described the incident as a video containing “threats posing a real danger of murder” committed “with hooligan motives.” Meanwhile, government critics, opposition figures, and platforms that frequently amplify Russian perspectives portrayed⁵ the incident as a “staged show orchestrated by the authorities.” Moreover, in the days immediately preceding the elections, dozens of additional videos featuring one or more masked individuals were published. These videos contained various allegations against the ruling party, as well as other parties, political forces, and public figures considered to be pro-government and participating in the elections. The allegations were presented as exclusive revelations but contained little to no evidence.

During the same period, several significant cyberattacks were also recorded. The most notable was a cyberattack⁶ targeting the broadcasting and digital infrastructure of Armenia’s Public Television (H1), aimed⁷ at disrupting the live broadcasts of the European Political Community Summit.

Throughout the first two weeks of the election campaign, Armenia’s internet infrastructure experienced sustained, large-scale Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks that disrupted online services. In response, the Information Systems Agency of Armenia (ISAA) publicly acknowledged the attacks and issued an official statement⁸.

MDI’s analysis indicates that external actors effectively leveraged local media outlets and social media platforms to exploit Armenia’s security concerns and the sensitive border delimitation process in pursuit of their own strategic objectives.

PART 2. CASE STUDIES OF KEY FIMI INCIDENTS

Case 1. The “Ukrainization of Armenia” Campaign in the Context of President Zelenskyy’s Visit and the EU Summit

Dataset: 21 Telegram channels, approximately 120 posts, and around 5.9 million views. These figures refer only to the volume of content analyzed within the scope of the monitoring exercise.

1. Context

Between May 1 and May 9, a coordinated campaign emerged across Telegram channels and media platforms portraying President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s planned visit to Yerevan and the EU-Armenia Summit as dangerous developments. These events were framed as evidence that Armenia was becoming a “second Ukraine” and the next potential target of war.

• Primary objective: To delegitimize Armenia’s European integration efforts in the run-up to the June 7 parliamentary elections by linking them to the risks of war and the loss of sovereignty.
• Risk assessment: High, due to (a) Armenia’s domestic political environment, (b) the parliamentary election context, (c) the campaign’s extensive reach (approximately 5.9 million views), and (d) evidence of coordinated dissemination.
• Target audience: Armenian citizens eligible to vote, particularly those with heightened security concerns.

2. Campaign Trigger and Launch

The campaign was primarily triggered by the anticipated visit of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Yerevan on May 3 and the inaugural EU-Armenia Summit that was scheduled to follow. The information environment was further amplified by discussions surrounding the possibility of Ukrainian drone strikes targeting Moscow during the May 9 Victory Day parade, following statements⁹ made by President Zelenskyy.

The campaign originated on major Russian-language Telegram channels, from where its core narratives were rapidly localized and disseminated through a network of Armenian-language Telegram channels within minutes.

3. Actor Ecosystem

The campaign’s network structure demonstrates a two-tiered dynamic, with a clear division of roles and functions among participating actors.

• Originators: Major Russian-language Telegram channels (including @rybar, @dva_majors, @SolovievLive, @caucasar, etc.) generated the core narratives, producing approximately 38 posts.
• Amplifiers: Russian-language Telegram channels targeting Armenian audiences (including @mikayelbad, @tzitzak, @parallel95, @armsens, etc.) published approximately 70 posts. Their primary role was not to expand audience reach but to localize the narratives and connect them to Armenia’s domestic political landscape and the ongoing parliamentary election campaign.

4. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs – DISARM)

Decontextualization.

• Unverified claims¹⁰ regarding Ukraine’s alleged use of phosphorus weapons were reframed into the emotionally charged accusation that “Zelenskyy burned our boys” (@tzitzak, @lizahatson).
• Statements¹¹ by Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Putin were taken out of context and presented as direct evidence of an imminent “loss of sovereignty” (@armgeopolitic).

Visual Manipulation.

• A photograph ¹²published from Donetsk showing a mobile phone with an insignia resembling that of Armenia’s National Security Service (NSS) was presented as purported evidence that “Armenian special forces are fighting in Ukraine” (@rybar, @caucasar).
• A staged incident¹³ involving the burning of a Ukrainian flag at Yerablur Military Pantheon was widely circulated as visual content intended to reinforce anti-Ukrainian sentiment (@Colonelcassad).

5. Response

According to research¹⁴ by DFRLab, Armenia’s shift in foreign policy orientation, including closer ties with the European Union and the suspension of its participation in the CSTO, was met in 2025 with a coordinated messaging campaign by Kremlin-linked actors and pro-Russian Telegram channels. These actors systematically promoted narratives warning of the “Ukrainization” of Armenia and the opening of a “second front.”

According to an analysis¹⁵ by EUvsDisinfo, pro-Kremlin media have also circulated the false conspiracy narrative that Armenia is following Ukraine’s “tragic” path by placing itself entirely under Western control.

Case 2. The Return of 300,000 Azerbaijanis to “Western Azerbaijan”

Dataset: 21 Telegram channels, approximately 305 posts, including 59 duplicated posts. These figures refer only to the volume of content analyzed within the scope of the monitoring exercise.

1. Context

The “Western Azerbaijan” concept has been promoted in recent years through official and semi-official Azerbaijani rhetoric, including claims regarding the “return” of Azerbaijanis to territories within Armenia. In Armenia’s domestic political discourse, this issue is frequently used to criticize Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his policy on Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations and the peace process by advancing the claim that the government may ultimately concede to Azerbaijan’s demands.

• Primary objective: To reduce public confidence in the government’s peace agenda and strengthen perceptions of a security threat.
• Risk assessment: High, due to (a) the direct electoral context, (b) attempts to normalize Azerbaijan’s state-promoted territorial narratives within Armenia’s information environment, and (c) synchronized coordination.
• Target audience: Citizens concerned about security and territorial integrity, as well as members of the Armenian diaspora.

2. Campaign Trigger and Launch

Primary trigger: The campaign was rooted in Azerbaijani state rhetoric, particularly President Ilham Aliyev’s statement¹⁶ in January 2025 that “300,000 Western Azerbaijanis must return, and this issue has never been removed from the agenda.” It was further reinforced by developments in Baku, including a university conference presenting¹⁷ the return to “Western Azerbaijan” as a matter of historical justice, a public lecture¹⁸ held at the Western Azerbaijan Center, and the establishment¹⁹ of a university department dedicated to studying the “economic potential of Western Azerbaijan.”

Campaign launch: The narrative evolved during the election campaign through claims²⁰ that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was pursuing policies that benefited Azerbaijan, as well as the active circulation of the slogan²¹, “Are we choosing to live in Armenia or in Western Azerbaijan?”. In June, the campaign continued during the televised election debate between party leaders, when an opposition representative widely publicized²² the relevant section of the Foreign Intelligence Service report.

3. Actor Ecosystem

The campaign’s network structure demonstrates a two-tiered dynamic.

• Originators: Official Azerbaijani sources (including statements by President Ilham Aliyev and Baku TV).
• Amplifiers: Opposition figures commenting on the issue in the context of the parliamentary elections, along with Russian-language Telegram channels (Narek Karapetyan, Robert Kocharyan, @parallel95, @rusyerevantoday, @lizahatson, @armsens, @tzitzak, @Armenian_Life, @mikayelbad, @Im_Hayastan, @armnewz, @tovgeneral, @caucasar, @archiuja). Characteristic behavior։ Synchronized republication of identical text across 4-8 channels within a matter of hours.

4. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs – DISARM)

• Narrative Laundering: The Azerbaijani narrative was introduced into Armenia’s information space indirectly, through analyses published by Russian-language Telegram channels rather than by Azerbaijani sources themselves. One example was the post titled²³: “The Path to Self-Destruction: How Pashinyan Is Turning Armenia into ‘Western Azerbaijan.'”
• Fearmongering: In the context of the elections, voting for the Civil Contract party was portrayed ²⁴as creating the risk of “300,000 Safarovs” entering Armenia. Similarly, the closure of a school²⁵ in Armenia was presented as evidence that Azerbaijanis would be resettled there, accompanied by the question: “How many Safarovs will be among them?”
• Decontextualization: Isolated excerpts from statements by government officials were taken out of context. For example, Arsen Torosyan’s remark that “Armenia should cease to be monoethnic” was presented²⁶ as “direct evidence” of a planned resettlement policy.

5. Response

The circulating claims were officially denied. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated²⁷ that the Armenian authorities have never discussed, and are not discussing, the issue of the “return of 300,000 Azerbaijanis” with Azerbaijan, describing such claims as unfounded.

At the same time, the Fact Investigation Platform (FIP.am) found²⁸ that a number of publications on the topic relied on incomplete and out-of-context excerpts from statements made by representatives of the Civil Contract party.

Case 3. The “Vilayetization” of Armenia Following the Moldova Scenario

Dataset: 21 Telegram channels, approximately 140 posts, and around 2 million views. These figures refer only to the volume of content analyzed within the scope of the monitoring exercise.

1. Context

This theme became one of the main FIMI campaign narratives in May 2026, as it was directly linked to Armenia’s energy security challenges and the legal dispute surrounding the South Caucasus Railway. Russian statements regarding the possible revision of gas tariffs and logistical restrictions were presented in the information space through the lens of Moldova’s political crisis. The message conveyed to the public was that a sharp shift in Armenia’s foreign policy would lead not to Europeanization, but to isolation and deeper economic dependence.

• Primary objective: To portray Armenia’s path toward European integration as a process of losing sovereignty and becoming a “vilayet,” “guberniya,” or “colony.” The campaign also sought to pre-emptively legitimize allegations of electoral fraud by drawing parallels between Moldova/Ukraine/Georgia → Armenia and to present Russia as the only viable alternative, thereby influencing the outcome of the June 7 parliamentary elections.
• Risk assessment: High, due to:
  (a) attempts to delegitimize the election results in advance;
  (b) mobilization of fear around the issue of sovereignty; and
  (c) synchronized coordination.
• Target audience: Armenian citizens eligible to vote, particularly those who are sensitive to issues of national sovereignty.

2. Campaign Trigger and Launch

The campaign was triggered by the EU Summit held in Yerevan on May 4, which was portrayed in the information space as the arrival of “Western envoys” in Armenia. The FIMI narrative was further reinforced by publications²⁹ about the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, which presented it in a humiliating light, by Vladimir Putin’s statement ³⁰that any choice between the EAEU and the EU should be decided through a referendum, and by claims³¹ that Armenia was being turned into a “vilayet financed by European and American money.”

The campaign was launched on May 4, the day of the summit, and continued to gain momentum until early June, accompanied by claims ³²that Armenia would be forced out of the Eurasian Economic Union.

3. Actor Ecosystem

The campaign’s network structure demonstrates a two-tiered dynamic, with a clear division of roles and functions.

• Originators: Russian state media and officials (including Sergey Lavrov³³, Vladimir Putin³⁴, and Dmitry Suslov³⁵).
• Amplifiers: Russian-language Telegram channels, including @armsens, @rusyerevantoday, @lizahatson, @parallel95, @armnewz, @Im_Hayastan, @caucasar, @archiuja, @tovgeneral, @rybar, @dva_majors, and @SolovievLive. The dissemination pattern was characterized by the synchronized circulation of identical or nearly identical texts across five or more channels within a period of one to two days.

4. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs – DISARM)

Rhetorical Reversal: The government’s message³⁶ that Armenia should “not become a Russian guberniya” was turned against it through the counterclaim³⁷ that “the government is turning the country into a Turkish vilayet.” Similarly, President Macron’s statement³⁸ that Armenia was “no longer a Russian satellite” was countered with the response³⁹: “But is it acceptable for it to become a vilayet of Turkey and Azerbaijan?”

Historical Parallel: The claim⁴⁰ https://t[.]me/archiuja/26981  that “the same methodology that worked in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia” was projected ⁴¹onto Armenia as an inevitable trajectory, through messages such as: “Armenia is being pushed toward the Moldovan scenario, but Russia’s position here is more decisive.”

Coordinated Behavior: The flagship post⁴² claiming that “the Moldovan scenario is leading Armenia toward vilayetization” was reproduced almost verbatim across more than five Telegram channels within one to two days, including @armsens⁴³, @armnewz⁴⁴, @Im_Hayastan⁴⁵, and @tzitzak⁴⁶.

5. Response

At the official level, in early June 2026, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan responded to the proposal by the leaders of four EAEU member states to hold a referendum in Armenia on choosing between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). He stated⁴⁷ that there were currently no grounds for such a referendum, explaining that Armenia’s European integration process had not yet reached a stage at which this question should be put to a public vote.

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The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and the Prague Civil Society Centre.

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